Lowy Institute Poll 2024 Report

Relations in the Indo-Pacific

China

One of the most dramatic shifts over the 20-year history of the Lowy Institute Poll has been in Australian attitudes towards China. In 2016, China topped the list for ‘Australia’s best friend in Asia’. Today, trust in China and confidence in its leader remain at a fraction of previous levels.

This reflects a turbulent period in Australia–China relations that began around 2016 as Canberra became more forthright regarding its concerns about the Chinese government’s intentions in the region and allegations of interference in Australian politics. China responded by freezing high-level contact from 2020, and later by imposing a range of coercive trade measures against Australia.

The 2022 election of the Albanese Labor government in Australia provided a circuit breaker. Over the past two years, Australia and China have re-engaged at a political level, with leaders and foreign and trade ministers meeting their counterparts on several occasions. Beijing has progressively lifted trade blockages, and in late 2023 released Australian journalist Cheng Lei from detention. Australian officials cautiously refer to this current phase of the relationship as ‘stabilisation’, while Chinese officials have more optimistically described it as an ‘improvement’.

China: economic partner or security threat?

Changing public attitudes towards China are particularly evident on the question of whether Australians see China as more of an economic partner or security threat.

Up until 2020, the most prevalent view was that China was more of an economic partner than it was a military or security¹ threat to Australia. This flipped in 2021, at the nadir of the political relationship and while Beijing’s trade restrictions were in full force. Then, a clear majority (63%) saw China more as a security threat, while only one-third (34%) saw China as more of an economic partner, a trend that held steady in 2022. The following year, as the relationship began to thaw, threat perceptions mellowed, and public opinion moved back towards a more even split between the two views.

In 2024, public attitudes appear to have plateaued rather than rebounded to the relative positivity of last decade. Slightly more than half of Australians (53%) now see China as more of a security threat, while 44% see it as more of an economic partner — results that have held steady from 2023.

China as a military threat

When looking to the future, threat perceptions of China are more widespread. A strong majority of Australians (71%) continue to think it ‘somewhat likely’ or ‘very likely’ that China will become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years. While this is a four-point drop from last year, it still stands in marked contrast to 2018, when less than half (45%) perceived China as a future military threat.

Australia–China relations

The Australian public is divided on the current state of the bilateral relationship, with those who describe it as ‘quite bad’ (47%) slightly outnumbering those who see it as ‘quite good’ (43%). Stronger views are in the small minority — only 6% describe the relationship as ‘very bad’, and almost none (1%) as ‘very good’.

China: emphasis on deterrence or stability

In recent years, successive Australian governments have pursued a defence strategy that seeks to deter China from altering the status quo in the Indo-Pacific by using military force. The elevated role of deterrence is evident in the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) partnership, which includes a plan to equip Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, and was made explicit in the 2024 National Defence Strategy (released after the completion of fieldwork for this Poll), which states “deterrence is now Australia’s primary strategic defence objective”.²

In parallel to its deterrence strategy, the current Australian government has pursued a diplomatic policy of ‘stabilisation’ and reassurance towards China. This involves consistent official messaging on enduring areas of concern, clarity that Australia is seeking peace and stability in the region, and an openness to cooperation in specific areas.

Deterrence and stable engagement are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the Australian government has underlined its belief that these two tracks can reinforce each other. But so too can they undermine each other — a strong emphasis on deterrence could impact on the stability of the relationship, while a strong emphasis on stability may lessen the appetite to participate in some forms of deterrence.

In 2024, half of all Australians (51%) say Australia should place more importance on a stable relationship with China than working with allies to deter China’s use of military force. A slightly lower proportion (45%) say that Australia should place more importance on deterring China’s use of military force, even if it means harming Australia’s relationship with China.

United States

The US alliance

Despite declining trust in the United States and its president, the Australia–US alliance, known as ANZUS, continues to enjoy widespread support among Australians. In 2024, the vast majority of Australians (83%) say the alliance is ‘very important’ or ‘fairly important’ to Australia’s security, steady from last year, and five points below a record high of 87% in 2022.

Australians’ broad support for the alliance has been one of the most resilient features over two decades of Lowy Institute polling, largely withstanding leadership changes and political swings in the United States. Nevertheless, on average, Australians placed more importance on the alliance during the terms of presidents Obama and Biden than they did during the terms of presidents Bush and Trump.

Australians’ views of the United States and the alliance defy simple characterisation. Although more than six in ten (63%) say that the alliance makes Australia safer from attack or pressure from China, when they look to the future, three-quarters (75%) also believe the alliance makes it more likely Australia will be drawn into a war in Asia.

2024 US presidential election

US President Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are their parties’ presumptive nominees for the 2024 US presidential election. President Biden is the clear favourite for Australians, with two-thirds (68%) preferring to see him elected.

A significant minority of Australians, nearly one in three (29%), would prefer to see Donald Trump elected. A preference for Trump is higher among those who lean politically towards One Nation (78%) or the Liberal–National Coalition (46%) than those who lean towards Labor or the Greens (both 14%).

When asked similar questions in the lead-up to the four most recent US presidential elections, a clear majority of Australians expressed a preference for the Democratic over the Republican candidate. However, support for Donald Trump in Australia has risen markedly compared to his previous two presidential candidacies in 2020 and 2016, and is higher than support for any Republican presidential candidate included in past editions of the Lowy institute Poll.

India

Over the past five years, Australia and India have drawn closer together politically, economically, and strategically. Australian and Indian prime ministers and their ministers now engage regularly on a bilateral basis and through groupings such as the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, the United States) and the G20. Australia and India have launched reciprocal strategies aimed at boosting two-way trade and investment, and agreed a trade deal that entered into force in December 2022. The tempo of defence and security cooperation has also lifted as both countries seek to deepen partnerships to balance China’s growing military weight in the Indo-Pacific.

At the same time, media and international human rights groups have documented religious discrimination as well as voiced concerns about an erosion of free speech and freedom of the press in India.

In a new question this year, Australians were asked to rank as a high, medium, or low priority three different issues in Australia’s engagement with India. In a follow-up question, respondents were then asked which of the three Australia should give the highest priority.

Four in ten Australians (42%) say trade and investment should be the highest priority in the relationship with India. One-third (32%) say human rights should be the top bilateral priority, while only two in ten (20%) give defence and regional security cooperation top billing.

Pacific Islands

Influence in the Pacific Islands

The Pacific Islands region has become a key arena in the contest for influence between China and the United States and its partners. Both superpowers are seeking to expand their roles as security partners in Pacific Islands countries, and are strengthening their development and diplomatic footprints in the region. Australia and New Zealand — both members of the Pacific Islands Forum — have also ramped up their diplomatic, aid, and security sector engagement with the Pacific.

In 2024, a new question tested Australians’ perceptions about influence in the region. One-third of Australians (34%) perceive China to be the most influential player in the Pacific Islands region, slightly more than those who say Australia (31%) has the most influence. Only one-quarter (25%) nominate the United States as most influential, while a small minority (8%) select New Zealand.

The prominence of China in Australians’ perceptions of regional influence accords with previous Lowy Institute Polls, which revealed high anxiety about China’s growing presence in the Pacific Islands. Last year, almost nine in ten Australians (87%) were ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ concerned about China potentially ‘opening a military base in a Pacific Islands country’.

Migration for Pacific Islanders

In recent years, the Australian government has expanded schemes to open further opportunities for Pacific Islander mobility to Australia. These include the Pacific Australia Labour Mobility scheme for time-limited work stays, a Pacific Engagement Visa offering permanent residency, and a permanent migration pathway for Tuvaluans under the Falepili Union treaty.

Australians are broadly supportive of the idea of further easing restrictions on Pacific Islanders seeking to travel to or settle in Australia. Two-thirds of Australians (67%) say they would support relaxing visa requirements for citizens of Pacific Islands countries to live, work, and study in Australia, while less than one-third (31%) would oppose it.