Observation
In recent years, successive Australian governments have pursued a defence strategy that seeks to deter China from altering the status quo in the Indo-Pacific by using military force. The elevated role of deterrence is evident in the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) partnership, which includes a plan to equip Australia with more capable nuclear-powered submarines, and was made explicit in the 2024 National Defence Strategy (released after the completion of fieldwork for this Poll), which states “deterrence is now Australia’s primary strategic defence objective”.
In parallel to its deterrence strategy, the current Australian government has pursued a diplomatic policy of ‘stabilisation’ and reassurance towards China. This involves consistent official messaging on enduring areas of concern, clarity that Australia is seeking peace and stability in the region, and an openness to cooperation in specific areas.
Deterrence and stable engagement are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the Australian government has underlined its belief that these two tracks can reinforce each other. But so too can they undermine each other — a strong emphasis on deterrence could impact on the stability of the relationship; while a strong emphasis on stability may lessen the appetite to participate in some forms of deterrence.
In 2024, half of all Australians (51%) say Australia should place more importance on a stable relationship with China than working with allies to deter China’s use of military force. A slightly lower proportion (45%) say that Australia should place more importance on deterring China’s use of military force, even if it means harming Australia’s relationship with China.