Lowy Institute Poll 2025 Report

Defence and security

Defence spending

In recent years, there has been a greater focus on whether the Australian Defence Force has the resources and capabilities it needs to meet the threats facing the nation.

In 2023, the Australian government’s National Defence Statement said Australia’s defence posture needed to shift to focus on ‘transforming our future capability such that Australia can resist coercion … in a much less certain region and world’.¹

More recently, the Trump administration has renewed pressure on US allies to increase their defence spending. In a meeting with his Australian counterpart, US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth called on Australia to increase its defence spending to 3.5% of GDP as soon as possible.² Currently, Australia spends approximately 2% of GDP on defence.

In the leadup to the Australian federal election in May, the Albanese government said it would bring forward additional defence spending, lifting the total to about 2.3% of GDP by 2033. The Coalition said, if elected, it would lift defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2030.³

In response to a new question polled separately in April, half the population (51%) say Australia should increase defence spending. A minority (37%) say Australia should keep defence spending at about the same level as now, while only 10% say it should be decreased.

There are clear demographic differences in how Australians respond on this matter — far fewer younger Australians (34% of 18 to 29 year olds) are supportive of increasing defence spending than older Australians (71% of those older than 60). As a group, females (46%) are less supportive than males (58%), and those who lean towards Labor (50%) are less supportive than those who prefer the Coalition (72%).

AUKUS: Nuclear‑powered submarines

In the fourth year of AUKUS — the security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States — the three governments are proceeding with a plan for Australia to acquire at least three conventionally-armed Virginia class nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) from the early 2030s. The plan also includes the design and construction of a new SSN–AUKUS class of submarines for delivery to the Royal Australian Navy from the early 2040s.

Since its inception, public debate about this deal has continued, including on its strategic merits, its effect on Australia’s sovereignty, the likelihood of future US political commitment, Australia’s ability to build the requisite industrial and workforce capacity, and the high costs involved. Proponents argue the submarines would improve Australia’s ability to defend itself and contribute to deterring conflict in the region.

Majority public support for acquiring nuclear-powered submarines has held firm. In 2025, two-thirds of Australians (67%) remain either ‘somewhat’ or ‘strongly’ in favour, roughly steady compared to 2022 (70%), shortly after AUKUS was announced. One-third of Australians (32%) are ‘somewhat against’ or ‘strongly against’ acquiring nuclear-powered submarines.

While the submarine deal continues to enjoy bipartisan political support in Australia, more Australians who lean towards the Liberal–National Coalition (84%) than those who lean towards the Labor Party (63%) are in favour of it — a 21-point gap.

Residents of Western Australia, which hosts one of the naval bases for these submarines, are most supportive of the deal (72%), though support in Queensland (70%) is on par with this. There is much lower majority support for it in Victoria (60%).

War in Ukraine: Australia’s response

Three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the war is deadlocked. But since taking office in January, Donald Trump has transformed the US position on the conflict. In February, prior to fieldwork for this Poll, Trump publicly berated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office, paused American intelligence sharing with Ukraine in February and early March, and voted with Russia and against Europe on UN resolutions on the conflict.

In the wake of President Trump’s actions and comments, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and other European leaders have taken a more prominent role in coordinating military and diplomatic support for Ukraine, convening a ‘coalition of the willing’ of liberal democracies. Australian Prime Minister Albanese participated in these talks, and foreshadowed he was ‘open to considering any requests to contribute to a future peacekeeping effort’ in Ukraine.⁴

In this context, Australian public support for assisting Ukraine remains high. The vast majority of Australians (84%) continue to support ‘keeping strict sanctions on Russia’, only five points below 2022. More than three-quarters (77%) support ‘admitting Ukrainian refugees into Australia’, roughly steady on last year. Almost three-quarters (73%) support ‘providing military aid to Ukraine’, also steady on last year.

In answer to a new question polled separately in April, a clear majority of Australians (71%) say they support ‘Australia participating in a European-led peacekeeping mission in Ukraine, after a ceasefire has been agreed’. This includes 30% of Australians who would ‘strongly support’ doing so.

Willingness to defend Australia

The Australian Defence Force has struggled to recruit sufficient personnel to meet its growing needs.⁵ Although it is difficult to predict how Australians would react in the event the country came under military attack, in response to a new question this year, half the adult population (52%) say they would be willing to fight to defend Australia if they were physically capable of doing so. One-quarter (24%) say they would not, while the remainder (25%) say they don’t know or are not sure.

Preparedness to fight for Australia is significantly higher among males (62%) than females (41%), and lower among people aged under 45 (37%) than people aged 45 and over (65%). Of the male population, about half (48%) aged under 45 say they would fight to defend Australia, while a significantly higher proportion of males aged over 45 (74%) would do so.