Lowy Institute Poll 2023

Global powers and world leaders

Trust in global powers

Each year, the Lowy Institute Poll asks about levels of trust in global powers. This year, the vast majority of Australians continue to trust Japan (85%), the United Kingdom (84%) and France (79%) ‘somewhat’ or ‘a great deal’ to act responsibly in the world.

By the same measure, Russia (8%) and China (15%) are once again the least trusted global powers of those surveyed. For China, this is a marginal increase on last year (12%) but remains strikingly low compared to five years ago, when half of Australians (52%) expressed trust in China. Similarly, trust in Russia plummeted following its invasion of Ukraine last year, and currently sits 20 points below 2018 levels.

Trust in the United States (61%) has dropped by four points, compared to 2022, but is still ten points higher than in 2020 (the last year of the Trump administration).

Levels of trust in India (58%) and Indonesia (51%) remain stable on last year, having fluctuated in previous years.

Confidence in world leaders

Australians have the highest levels of confidence in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (included in the Lowy Institute Poll for the first time), who captured global attention for his leadership of Ukraine in the face of Russia’s invasion. Seven in ten Australians (72%) say they have either ‘some’ or ‘a lot’ of confidence in Zelenskyy, the same as in recently sworn-in New Zealand Prime Minister Chris Hipkins. More Australians express ‘a lot of confidence’ in Zelenskyy (31%) than they do in any of the ten other leaders listed.

French President Emmanuel Macron and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida are the next most highly ranked leaders, with 64% of Australians saying they have ‘some’ or ‘a lot’ of confidence in each.

Confidence in US President Joe Biden remains steady at 59%, although this is ten points lower than 2021, the year he was inaugurated. Confidence in UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak (63%) is marginally higher than in his predecessor Boris Johnson (59% in 2022).

Echoing the decline in Australians’ trust in China in recent years, confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping remains low at 11%. The only leaders in whom Australians have less confidence are Russian President Vladimir Putin (7%) and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (3%).

Feelings thermometer

The ‘feelings thermometer’ rates Australians’ warmth towards other countries and territories, as well as the European Union and the United Nations, on a scale of 0° (coldest feelings) to 100° (warmest feelings), with each score reflecting the mean of responses.

Australians continue to feel warmest towards New Zealand, at 85°, followed by Japan and the United Kingdom at 75°. By contrast, Australians continue to feel cool towards China this year (33°), despite recent moves towards a stabilisation of the

Australia–China relationship. This low reading has been steady since 2021 and is almost half the level of warmth felt towards China five years ago, in 2018 (58°). The only countries that Australians feel cooler towards are Russia (20°) and North Korea (16°).

Feelings towards the United States (63°) have remained largely steady for the last five years, after declining from an all-time high of 73° in 2015.

Feelings towards Indonesia (57°) have warmed incrementally over time, edging up seven degrees since the thermometer began in 2006. Meanwhile, feelings towards India (58°) have fluctuated modestly over time, and currently stand four degrees below a high of 62° in 2006.

For the first time since 2017, Australians were asked how they felt about Solomon Islands. Despite public anxiety about the country signing a security pact with China in March 2022, feelings of warmth towards Solomon Islands (61°) have changed little from 2017, when it scored 64°.

Australia’s best friend in Asia

Australians are once again most likely to name Japan (44%) as ‘Australia’s best friend in Asia’ from a list of six countries. There is an almost 30-point margin between Japan and the countries ranked next on this measure, India (16%) and Singapore (15%). The number of Australians who selected India has more than doubled since 2022.

By contrast, China ranked second-lowest on the list, with only 7% seeing it as Australia’s best friend in Asia, again highlighting how attitudes towards China have changed. Less than a decade ago, Japan and China shared the title of Australia’s best friend in Asia, and in 2016 China topped the list.

South Korea remains a consistent underperformer on this metric, with only 4% identifying it as Australia’s best friend in Asia — despite a strong bilateral relationship, developing strategic ties and growing cultural links.

Safety and threats

Feelings of safety

The Lowy Institute Poll shows that Australians feel the turmoil that has marked global affairs in recent years.

In 2020, Australians’ feelings of safety fell to historic lows. As the Covid-19 pandemic swept the world, only 50% of Australians said they felt ‘very safe’ or ‘safe’, the lowest result ever recorded by the Poll. Feelings of safety improved in 2021, but then fell again in 2022, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In 2023, feelings of safety have recovered, with 63% of the population saying they feel ‘very safe’ or ‘safe’. While a ten-point improvement on last year, this remains significantly below the high watermark of 2010, when feelings of safety stood at 92%. Further, the number of Australians who feel ‘very safe’ today remains low at 6%, a mere seventh of the number who felt this way in 2010.

Threats to Australia’s vital interests

‘Cyberattacks from other countries’ now tops the list of threats worrying Australians. Seven in ten (68%) say cyberattacks are a critical threat to Australia’s vital interests in the next ten years, an 11-point increase since 2018. This result comes as perceptions of other threats — including Covid-19 and Russian and Chinese foreign policies — have receded. It also follows three of the most significant corporate data breaches in Australian history: in late 2022, Optus and Medibank user data was hacked and held for ransom, with hackers releasing sensitive health records of some Medibank customers on the dark web. During fieldwork for this Poll, Latitude Financial disclosed a data breach that eventually saw some 14 million customer records compromised.

Australians remain anxious about the prospect of ‘a military conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan’, with more than six in ten (64%) seeing this as a critical threat in the next ten years — steady from 2022, but almost twice as high as in 2020 (35%). However, against a backdrop of thawing Australia–China relations, fewer Australians see ‘China’s foreign policy’ as a critical threat, down six points from last year to 59%.

Despite Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, the number who identify Russia’s foreign policy as a critical threat (57%) fell 11 points from last year. At the same time, fewer Australians (49%) see ‘the rise of authoritarian systems of governments around the world’ as a critical threat, evident in a decline of six points from 2022.

Six in ten Australians remain concerned about the threat from ‘North Korea’s nuclear program’ (60%) and ‘climate change’ (59%). Despite rising cost of living pressures, deteriorating global economic conditions, and forecasts of future economic turmoil, ‘a severe downturn in the global economy’ does not appear to loom larger as a threat to Australia’s interests than it did in 2022. More than half (57%) of Australians see a severe economic downturn as a critical threat, much the same as in 2022 (55%). Levels of concern about ‘foreign interference in Australian politics’ also remained steady (51%).

Security and defence policy

Three years after the Covid-19 pandemic began and more than a year after the Australian government removed most public health restrictions, anxiety about ‘Covid-19 and other potential epidemics’ continues to fall. Only three in ten (30%) Australians now see the issue as a critical threat. This is a 12-point decrease from 2022, and a dramatic 46-point decrease from the early days of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 (76%).

This year has seen major developments in Australia’s defence policy. On 14 March, just as fieldwork for this Poll commenced, the prime ministers of Australia and the United Kingdom and the president of the United States (AUKUS leaders) met in San Diego to announce the details of their plan for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. On 24 April, after the vast majority of fieldwork for this poll had been completed, the Australian government released a public version of the Defence Strategic Review, a major report on Australia’s defence posture and structure.

AUKUS and nuclear-powered submarines

Regarding the AUKUS trilateral partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, around half of Australians think it will make Australia (49%) and the region (46%) safer. These opinions remain largely unchanged from last year. Notably, the number of Australians who have not heard of AUKUS or are not sure if it will make Australia or the region safer also did not shift significantly from 2022, despite heavy media coverage of AUKUS during fieldwork for this Poll.

Two-thirds of Australians (67%) are either ‘strongly’ or ‘somewhat’ in favour of the decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS, a similar result to that in 2022 (70%). However, in 2023, the proportion of Australians who say they ‘strongly’ favour the submarine acquisition dropped by seven points to 26%.

Although the AUKUS submarine program enjoys bipartisan political support in Australia, more Australians who lean towards the Liberal-National Coalition (86%) than those who lean towards the Labor Party (65%) are in favour of acquiring the submarines.1

In April 2023, in a separate survey conducted one month after the San Diego announcement, we asked Australians further questions about the AUKUS submarine program. Australians have mixed feelings about the impact that the nuclear-powered submarines will have on the likelihood of conflict in the region. Three in ten (28%) think the submarines will deter military conflict and help ensure stability in the Indo-Pacific region, while two in ten (20%) think they will increase the risk of military conflict and instability. Around half either say the submarines will make no difference (32%) or are not sure of their impact (20%).

In the April survey, we also asked Australians whether they think the estimated cost of the program, widely reported as between $268 billion and $368 billion, is worth paying for the additional capability nuclear-powered submarines provide. Almost half (47%) say they do not think the capability is worth the cost, while one-quarter (27%) say it is worth it. The same number (27%) are not sure.

Defence strategy

In the same April 2023 survey, which concluded two days after the public release of the Defence Strategic Review, we asked Australians about where the country’s defence capabilities should be focused. Four in ten (40%) say that to keep Australia safe, we should invest more in military capabilities that protect Australia close to home. A quarter (26%) believe we should invest more in military capabilities that deter potential enemies far from our shores. A significant number (34%) are unsure.

The Quad

In May 2023, the leaders of Australia, India, Japan and the United States convened on the sidelines of the G7 Summit in Hiroshima for the third annual Quad Leaders’ Summit. The Lowy Institute Poll, which went into the field almost three months before that meeting, found that half of Australians think the Quad will make both Australia (51%) and the region (50%) safer. Very few believe it will make Australia (4%) or the region (5%) less safe. These opinions remain unchanged from last year.

US military in Australia

In 2011, former Prime Minister Julia Gillard and former US President Barack Obama announced the rotation of US marines through Darwin, a deployment that has continued and expanded since then. In April 2023, as part of the AUKUS submarine decision, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and US President Joe Biden announced that one UK and up to four US nuclear-powered submarines would rotate through the HMAS Stirling naval base in Western Australia.

This year, over half of Australians (57%) say they are either ‘strongly’ or ‘somewhat’ in favour of allowing the United States to base military forces in Australia, down six points from 2022 (63%).

Australia’s support for Ukraine

In the second year of Russia’s war on Ukraine, Kyiv is preparing a counter-offensive. Amid debate among observers on whether the West can sustain momentum in its support for Ukraine, Australians continue to show strikingly high levels of support for assisting Ukraine.

Almost nine in ten (87%) say they ‘strongly’ or ‘somewhat’ support ‘keeping strict sanctions on Russia’, steady from 2022 (89%). Around eight in ten (84%) support ‘admitting Ukrainian refugees into Australia’. Three-quarters (76%) support ‘providing military aid to Ukraine’.

While overall levels of support for these response measures remain very high, the number who ‘strongly support’ each measure waned — by 15 points each for admitting Ukrainian refugees and providing military aid to Ukraine, and by eight points for keeping strict sanctions on Russia.

Relations in the Indo-Pacific

Future roles of the United States and China

When it comes to global power and influence, the United States has long been the world leader, but China’s power is clearly growing. For the first time, the Lowy Institute Poll asked Australians what they think about the trajectories of US and Chinese power over the next decade.

Most Australians think China’s role will continue to grow. Six in ten (61%) believe that in ten years, China will play ‘a more important and powerful role as a world leader’. More than a quarter (28%) think China’s position will remain ‘about the same as now’, while only one in ten (10%) expect China to play a ‘less important and powerful’ role.

By comparison, close to half of Australians (45%) expect the role and influence of the United States as a world leader to stay the same as it is now, while two in ten (22%) expect the United States to become more important and powerful. One-third (32%) of Australians think the United States will play a less important and powerful role as a world leader.

United States

The US alliance

In 2023, the vast majority of Australians (82%) see the alliance between Australia and the United States as ‘very important’ or ‘fairly important’ to Australia’s security, down five points from a record high last year of 87%.

High levels of public support for Australia’s alliance with the United States have been a consistent feature over 19 years of Lowy Institute polling. However, during this period, Australians’ support for the alliance has tended to be even higher during Democratic than Republican administrations.

At the same time, three-quarters of Australians (74%) think the alliance makes it more likely Australia will be drawn into a war in Asia. Six in ten (61%) think the alliance makes Australia safer from attack or pressure from China.

Respect for the United States

US President Joe Biden has announced his intention to contest the US presidential election in 2024. At time of writing, his controversial predecessor, Donald Trump, appears to be the front-runner to receive the Republican nomination, despite facing a range of ongoing legal cases.

Three-quarters (73%) of Australians think the United States is more respected in the world under President Biden, whereas only one-quarter (24%) think the United States was more respected under President Trump.

China

Australia–China relations

The last five years have been a difficult period in Australia’s relations with China. Australian governments have been more public and forthright in voicing their concerns about the Chinese government’s intentions and behaviour in the region. China has sought to punish Australia for perceived transgressions, including through a range of measures blocking trade. For much of this period, high-level contact between the two countries was frozen.

The past 12 months, however, have seen a stabilisation of the relationship. Following the Albanese government coming to power, ministerial contact between the Chinese and Australian governments has resumed. In the months prior to this Poll being conducted, Australian and Chinese leaders and their foreign, trade and defence ministers had met in person or virtually for the first time in years. In more recent months, Chinese restrictions on some Australian products have eased and there have been signs of progress on other trade blockages.

Australians were asked what they thought of the relative improvement in relations. More than half (56%) say the resumption of ministerial contact is either ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ positive for Australia’s national interests. The remainder are split between those who say it will have ‘no impact’ (21%) and those who say it will have either a ‘very negative’ or ‘somewhat negative’ impact (20%) on Australia’s national interests.

China: economic partner or security threat?

The improved atmosphere in the bilateral relationship coincides with a shift in the way Australians view China. The Lowy Institute Poll tracks whether Australians see China as more of an economic partner or as more of a security threat to Australia. This year, the number who see China as more of a security threat is down 11 points from 2022 to a bare majority (52%). Correspondingly, the number who see China as more of an economic partner (44%) is up 11 points from last year.

Nonetheless, the fact remains that about half of Australians continue to see China as more of a security threat than as an economic partner — in contrast with the situation just three years ago. In 2020, the dominant view was that China was more of an economic partner (55%), while only 41% saw it as more of a security threat.

Moreover, when they look to the future, a strong majority (75%) of Australians continue to believe it is ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ likely that China will become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years — unchanged from 2022 (75%), and significantly higher than in 2018 (45%).

Chinese military base in the Pacific

The vast majority of Australians (87%) say they are ‘very concerned’ or ‘somewhat concerned’ about China potentially opening a military base in a Pacific Island country. While the overall result is the same as for a similar question asked in 2022 (88%), the number who say they are ‘very concerned’ fell by 18 points.

In a different question posed in 2019, a smaller majority of Australians (55%) said China opening a military base in a Pacific Island country would pose a critical threat to Australia’s vital interests in the next ten years.

Potential conflict

In the event of a military conflict between China and the United States, more than half of Australians (56%) say Australia should remain neutral, an increase of five points from 2022. Four in ten (42%) say Australia should support the United States, down four points on 2022.

It is interesting, however, to compare this to views on a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which many experts see as the most likely trigger for a conflict between the United States and China. Australia’s response to such a scenario has also been the subject of growing debate among commentators.

For the first time, we asked Australians if they would support a range of responses, acting together with the United States, if China invaded Taiwan. The vast majority (80%) would support ‘accepting Taiwanese refugees into Australia’. A similarly strong majority (76%) say they would support ‘Australia imposing economic and diplomatic sanctions on China’.

Two-thirds (64%) would support ‘Australia sending arms and military supplies to the Taiwanese government’. Six in ten (61%) would support ‘using the Australian Navy to help prevent China from imposing a blockade around Taiwan’. The only option not supported by a majority is ‘sending Australian military personnel to Taiwan to help defend it from China’ (42%). 4

Australia and the Pacific

When the Albanese government assumed office in May 2022, it placed a high priority on improving relations with Pacific Island countries. In a new question this year, Australians were asked about the state of the country’s ties with its Pacific neighbours. Half (49%) think that Australia’s relations with Pacific Island countries are ‘staying about the same’, with the remainder roughly divided between those who think relations are improving (26%) and those who think relations are worsening (22%).

Australians remain overwhelmingly in favour of using aid to fund a range of objectives in Pacific Island countries. Almost all (92%) support providing aid for disaster relief, unchanged from 2022.

The vast majority of Australians favour providing aid ‘to help prevent China from increasing its influence in the Pacific’ (84%) as well as providing aid to the Pacific for ‘long-term economic development’ (83%), both steady on last year. Similarly, eight in ten (80%) support providing Covid-19 vaccines to Pacific Island countries, although this fell six points from last year. Support for climate-related aid to the Pacific remains steady at 76%.

Economic outlook and trade

Economic optimism

Despite global economic headwinds including persistent inflation, optimism about Australia’s economic performance in the next five years remains reasonably solid (62%), unchanged from 2022. While this is 17 points lower than optimism in 2021 (79%), when there were high hopes for a post-Covid global economic recovery, it is ten points higher than the record low registered at the outset of the pandemic in 2020.

This relatively stable outlook on Australia’s economic prospects mirrors Australians’ perceptions of the global economy. In 2023, the number of Australians who see ‘a severe downturn in the global economy’ as a critical threat (57%) has not increased substantially from 2022.

However, when it comes to the strength of optimism people feel, barely any Australians are now ‘very optimistic’ about the economy (3%), in contrast to the 19% who said they were very optimistic in 2010.

Looking across age groups in the Australian community, there is a difference in opinion on this issue between those at the opposite ends of the age spectrum. While 68% of those aged 60 years and over are optimistic about Australia’s economic performance in the next five years, only 55% of those aged 18–29 feel this way.

Supply chains

In recent months, senior US officials have outlined a strategy to improve the resilience of critical supply chains by sourcing goods mainly from friendly countries. US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen referred to this as ‘friendshoring’ and cast it as, among other things, a response to the ‘over-concentration of the production of critical goods inside China’.

In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Chinese trade restrictions on Australia, and rising US–China tensions, the idea of friendshoring supply chains also appears to resonate with Australians.

A strong majority (70%) say that Australia should place a high priority on ensuring supply chains run through countries that are friendly towards Australia, even if it means higher prices. Only three in ten (29%) say the priority should be ‘keeping prices as low as possible, even if it means that supply chains run through countries that are unfriendly towards Australia’. 5

However, opinions differ by age. People aged 45 and over are more likely to prioritise ‘friendshoring’ (79%) than people aged under 45 (59%).

Conversely, more people aged under 45 place a priority on keeping prices as low as possible (40%) compared to those aged 45 and over (19%).

Societal issues

Democracy

Three-quarters of Australians (73%) continue to see democracy as preferable to any other kind of government, unchanged from a record high last year (74%). One in five (19%) say that ‘in some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable’.

Younger Australians are now more likely to see democracy as preferable compared to five years ago, narrowing a long-running age gap on this issue. In 2018, there was a 28-point difference between the percentage of Australians aged under 45 who saw democracy as preferable (47%) and the percentage of those aged 45 and older who said the same (75%). In 2023, that generational difference in views has reduced to 11 points ­— 67% of that younger age group now see democracy as preferable, compared to 78% of those aged 45 and older.

Climate change

In March 2023, during fieldwork for this Poll, the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change completed its Sixth Assessment Report, synthesising years of global scientific knowledge on climate change. The landmark report concludes that the world is likely to exceed 1.5 degrees of warming in the near term; adverse impacts and cascading risks will escalate as the planet warms; and the window of opportunity to forestall the worst impacts of climate change is rapidly closing.

In the same month, after fieldwork for this Poll had concluded, the Australian parliament passed a key part of the government’s climate policy, the Safeguard Mechanism Amendment Bill. This followed a federal election last year in which a number of independent candidates were elected on platforms championing stronger action on climate change.

A majority of Australians (56%) continue to say ‘global warming is a serious and pressing problem’ about which ‘we should begin taking steps now, even if this involves significant costs’, slightly down by four points from 2022. Three in ten (32%) say ‘the problem of global warming should be addressed, but its effects will be gradual, so we can deal with the problem gradually by taking steps that are low in cost’. The remainder (11%) believe ‘until we are sure that global warming is really a problem, we should not take any steps that would have economic costs’.

There is a significant gap between how younger and older Australians respond to this question. Those aged under 30 are far more likely to see global warming as a serious and pressing problem requiring immediate action (72%), compared to a bare majority (53%) of those aged 30 and older who say the same.

Indigenous Voice

In late 2023, Australians will vote in a referendum on whether to alter the Australian Constitution to establish an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Voice. The Voice would be an independent body that would give advice to the Australian parliament and government on matters that affect the lives of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

In this year’s Poll, we asked if introducing the proposed Voice would have an impact on Australia’s international reputation. Australians are almost evenly divided, with 47% saying that a Voice would improve Australia’s reputation, while 44% say it would make no difference. Very few (8%) believe it would damage Australia’s reputation.

After polling concluded, Opposition leader Peter Dutton formally announced he would oppose the government’s proposal to establish a Voice. There is a stark divide in opinion along political party lines on the Voice’s potential impact on Australia’s reputation. 62% of those who lean towards the Labor Party think the Voice would improve Australia’s international reputation. Of those who lean towards the Liberal or National parties, only 25% say the Voice would improve Australia’s reputation, while 61% say it would make no difference. 6

Immigration

Australia’s Covid-19 restrictions saw a significant drop in the country’s annual migrant intake. The easing of those restrictions raised questions about the structure of Australia’s immigration program. In September 2022, the government announced a comprehensive review of Australia’s migration system. That review delivered its findings to the government in March 2023, and was released publicly in April after fieldwork for this Poll had been completed.

In response to a question on immigration in this year’s Poll, a slim majority of Australians (53%) say the number of immigrants allowed into Australia should return to pre-Covid levels. This represents a rise of seven points on 2022. A quarter (26%) say immigration should be ‘lower than pre-Covid levels’, a fall of seven points from 2022, while 20% say it should be ‘higher than pre-Covid levels’.

Australians born overseas do not express significantly higher levels of support for increasing immigration (22%) than those born in Australia (18%). As with the broader population, about half of overseas-born Australians (55%) say immigration levels should be ‘around the same as pre-Covid levels’.

Australian government performance

Budget priorities

This year, Australians were asked whether they think the government should increase, decrease, or keep spending the same for a range of budget priorities. As in previous years, most Australians support an increase in spending on health (85%) and education (73%). Across all other areas, the 2023 survey shows a drop, to varying degrees, in the number of Australians who believe spending should be increased.

The largest shift in opinion relates to defence spending. In 2022, 51% of Australians supported an increase in defence spending, a 20-point rise on the last time the question about budget priorities was asked in 2019. This year, however, support for increasing defence spending has fallen ten points to 41%. An almost equal number of Australians (39%) think defence spending should remain about the same, while 20% think it should be decreased.

In 2023, most Australians would keep foreign aid spending the same (43%). However, in a seven-point drop from last year, only 17% now support an increase in foreign aid spending. And more than double this number would reduce the aid budget (40%), a rise of six points on last year.

Support for increasing social welfare declined five points to 51% in 2023. Support for increasing spending on border protection dropped six points to 33%.

Labor government report card

Almost one year into the Labor government’s term, Australians were asked to give it a score out of ten for its handling of a number of issues.7 Australians give the government its highest mark for ‘maintaining a strong alliance with the United States’ (7.1 out of 10). This comes at a time when an overwhelming majority of Australians see the alliance as important to Australia’s security. The government is also rated highly for ‘presenting a good image of Australia internationally’ (6.8).

The Labor government receives its lowest mark for ‘managing Australia’s approach to climate change’ (5.3). On this issue, the majority of Australians have seen global warming as a ‘serious and pressing problem’ since 2015. The government receives its next lowest mark for ‘managing Australia’s economy’ (5.7).

In 2021, when the Lowy Institute Poll last asked this question, Australians awarded the then Coalition government its highest marks for ‘managing Australia’s response to Covid-19’ (7.7), followed by ‘maintaining Australia’s national security’ and ‘maintaining a strong alliance with the United States’ (both at 6.8).

In 2021, Australians also gave the then Coalition government its lowest mark for ‘managing Australia’s approach to climate change’ (4.6), and its next lowest mark for ‘managing Australia’s relationship with China’ (5.1).

Australian prime ministers and foreign policy

Over the past 15 years, Australia has had three Labor and three Coalition prime ministers. In this Poll, we asked Australians how they rated the foreign policy performance of each of these leaders, a question we last asked in 2016. 8

One year into the role, Anthony Albanese is ranked the highest of all prime ministers on this measure, with 83% of Australians saying he is doing a ‘very good’ or ‘reasonable’ job handling foreign policy. He is followed by Kevin Rudd (78%), Julia Gillard (77%) and Malcolm Turnbull (69%). Australians regard Tony Abbott (50%) and Scott Morrison (46%) the least favourably on their handling of foreign policy.

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Methodology

The methodology for the Lowy Institute Poll 2023 is available here.

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Acknowledgements

While only one name appears on the cover, this report is the product of many people’s efforts. Anthony Bubalo played a substantial role in the questionnaire design, analysis of results and drafting of this report. At the Lowy Institute, Clare Caldwell edited the report, Michael Fullilove, Hervé Lemahieu and Jennifer Hsu provided comments, and Jack Sato provided data-checking assistance. Stephen Hutchings designed the report booklet and the interactive website.

Fieldwork was managed by Jane Shore and Tina Petroulias of the Social Research Centre. Benjamin Phillips, Andrew Ward, Sam Slamowicz and Jack Barton of the Social Research Centre provided advice on design, weighting, and statistical analysis. John Davis of OmniPoll provided independent advice and reviewed the questionnaires and report.

Several questions in this report and previous Lowy Institute Polls were modelled on those developed by other polling organisations, including the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, the Pew Research Center, Australian Election Study, Scanlon Foundation Research Institute, Ipsos MORI and Essential.