Executive summary
Global powers and world leaders
Few Australians (17%) say they trust China ‘somewhat’ or ‘a great deal’ to act responsibly in the world, representing a small increase over the last two years, but a sharp contrast to six years ago, when that figure was 52%. Feelings towards China remain cool: China registers 34° on the feelings thermometer, and only 12% of Australians express any confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Australians reserve the least trust for Russia (8%) out of a list of eight countries, and only 7% have any confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin.
By contrast, Australians feel very positive towards Japan, ranking it highest in terms of trust (87%), second highest on confidence in its leader, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (61%), and giving it a very warm 75° on the feelings thermometer. For the third year in a row, Japan topped a list of six countries as ‘Australia’s best friend in Asia’.
Levels of trust towards the United States dropped five points to 56%, and confidence in US President Joe Biden fell by 13 points to 46%, a low point for him on this measure. Confidence in Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy also fell by 12 points to 60%.
Trust in India (56%) and Indonesia (52%) remained moderate, while confidence in their leaders Narendra Modi (37%) and Joko Widodo (33%) remained low.
China
Notwithstanding low trust in China, the Australian public is roughly divided on the state of the bilateral relationship, with 53% saying the relationship is ‘very’ or ‘quite’ bad, and 44% saying that it is ‘very’ or ‘quite’ good. Half (51%) say Australia should place more importance on a stable relationship with China, while 45% say that Australia should place more importance on deterring China.
A slim majority of Australians (53%) see China as more of a security threat than an economic partner, while 44% see it as more of an economic partner than a security threat. These results have held steady from 2023, but are roughly inverse to attitudes in 2020, when 55% of Australians saw China more as an economic partner, and 41% as more a security threat. Looking to the future, a strong majority of Australians (71%) continue to think it ‘somewhat likely’ or ‘very likely’ that China will become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years.
United States
In the lead-up to the 2024 presidential election, two-thirds of Australians (68%) would prefer to see Joe Biden re-elected, while one in three (29%) prefer Donald Trump. Strong support for Australia’s alliance with the United States has been a mainstay over two decades of Lowy Institute polling. This year, the vast majority of Australians (83%) continue to say the alliance is ‘very important’ or ‘fairly important’ to Australia’s security.
Nevertheless, attitudes towards the United States are complex: while more than six in ten (63%) say the alliance makes Australia safer from attack or pressure from China, when they look to the future, 75% also believe the alliance makes it more likely Australia will be drawn into a war in Asia.
India
Four in ten Australians (42%) say ‘trade and investment’ should be the highest priority in the relationship with India. One-third (32%) say ‘human rights in India’ should be the top bilateral priority, while only two in ten (20%) give ‘defence and regional security cooperation’ top billing.
Pacific Islands
One-third of Australians (34%) perceive China to be the most influential player in the Pacific Islands region, slightly more than those who say Australia (31%) has the most influence. Only one-quarter (25%) nominate the United States as most influential.
On movement of people within the region, two-thirds of Australians (67%) say they would support relaxing visa requirements for citizens of Pacific Islands countries to live, work, and study in Australia.
Safety and threats
In 2024, six in ten Australians (62%) say they feel either ‘safe’ or ‘very safe’. This remains steady from last year, but 30 points below the high watermark of 2010 (92%).
‘Cyberattacks from other countries’ remains at the top of a list of possible threats, with seven in ten Australians (70%) identifying it as a ‘critical threat’ to Australia’s interests in the next ten years. Potential conflicts over Taiwan (59%) and the South China Sea (57%) loom larger as threats than the more distant conflicts in Ukraine (46%) or the Middle East (41%). Concern about the impact of ‘political instability in the United States’ on Australia rose by nine points to 41%, but along with ‘conflict in the Middle East’, was the lowest ranked threat on the list.
Security and defence
In the third year of AUKUS, almost two-thirds of Australians (65%) remain either ‘somewhat’ or ‘strongly’ in favour of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines. More Australians who lean towards the Liberal–National Coalition (81%) than those who lean towards the Labor Party (69%) are in favour of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, though this gap has narrowed substantially since last year.
If given a choice to establish closer security relations with one other country (apart from the United States and United Kingdom), 45% of Australians would choose Japan from a list of six. There is a large gap to the next highest preference, India (18%), followed by Indonesia (14%), France (12%), and South Korea (5%). Only 2% of Australians nominated the Philippines.
Australian public support for assisting Ukraine remains high. The vast majority of Australians (86%) continue to support ‘keeping strict sanctions on Russia’. Eight in ten (80%) support ‘admitting Ukrainian refugees into Australia’. Three-quarters support re-opening Australia’s embassy in Kyiv (76%) and ‘providing military aid to Ukraine’ (74%).
Economy and trade
A majority of Australians (58%) say they are either ‘optimistic’ or ‘very optimistic’ about Australia’s economic performance in the next five years. While a slight drop from 2023, this is the second-lowest level of economic optimism in the past two decades. Optimism fell more sharply in younger age groups.
A high proportion of Australians continue to support free trade, with, for example, eight in ten saying it is good for their standard of living. In relation to artificial intelligence (AI), on balance, a slightly larger number of Australians say the potential risks of AI outweigh the potential benefits (52%) compared to those who say the benefits outweigh the risks (45%).
Climate change
In 2024, a majority of Australians (57%) say global warming is a pressing problem about which ‘we should begin taking steps now, even if this involves significant costs’. Three in ten (30%) say global warming should be dealt with gradually by ‘taking steps that are low in cost’. Only 12% say we should not take any steps involving costs ‘until we are sure that global warming is really a problem’.
Australians express slim to strong majority support for a range of potential federal government climate policies, though in some cases, support has softened to varying degrees. The vast majority of Australians (87%) say they would support the government ‘providing subsidies for the development of renewable energy technologies’. Seven in ten Australians support committing to ‘a more ambitious national emissions reduction target’ (72%) and Australia hosting a UN climate conference (70%), both down five points from the last time this question was asked in 2022. A majority of Australians (63%) are also in favour of ‘providing financial support to help developing countries in our region manage the impacts of climate change’.
A majority continue to support reducing coal exports to other countries (60%) and banning new coal mines (59%), both small drops on 2022 results, but a decisive swing away from more positive public sentiment towards coal less than a decade ago. Majority support (58%) remains for ‘increasing the use of gas for Australia’s energy generation’, level with 2022. Support for introducing an emissions trading scheme dropped nine points from 2022 to 55% this year.
Energy policy
Almost half of Australians (48%) now say that ‘reducing household energy bills’ should be the main priority for the government’s energy policy, a sharp 16-point rise from a similar question in 2021. The number of Australians who say that ‘reducing carbon emissions’ should be the main priority has fallen 18 points to 37%.
On renewable energy, two-thirds of Australians (66%) think the government’s target to generate 82% of electricity from renewable sources by 2030 is either ‘about right’ (41%) or ‘not ambitious enough’ (25%). One-third (33%) say the renewable energy target is ‘too ambitious’.
On nuclear energy, six in ten Australians (61%) say they ‘somewhat’ or ‘strongly’ support Australia using nuclear power to generate electricity, while a significant minority (37%) ‘somewhat’ or ‘strongly’ oppose it.
Democracy
A large majority of Australians (72%) see democracy as preferable to any other kind of government. Younger Australians are less likely than older Australians to say democracy is preferable, a gap that has widened slightly since 2022.
Immigration
Almost half the population (48%) say the total number of migrants coming to Australia each year is ‘too high’, while the other half (50%) either think immigration levels are ‘about right’ (40%) or ‘too low’ (10%). Results are steady from pre-pandemic levels.
However, Australians are overwhelmingly positive about Australia’s cultural diversity. Nine in ten (90%) think Australia’s culturally diverse population has been either ‘mostly positive’ or ‘entirely positive’ for Australia.
Australian government performance
On the government’s overall foreign policy performance, a slim majority of Australians (56%) say the current Labor government is doing a good job, 15 points more than those who say it is doing a poor job (41%).
Australians give the government its highest mark out of ten for ‘maintaining a strong alliance with the United States’ (6.6 out of 10). Australians are moderately positive about the government’s management of relations with the Pacific Islands (5.8) and Southeast Asia (5.7). They mark the government hardest on ‘responding to the Israel–Hamas war’ (4.2), ‘managing Australia’s approach to climate change’ (4.8), and ‘promoting and defending human rights internationally’ (4.9).