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PREFACE

The unprovoked, unjustified and brutal invasion of Ukraine by its nuclear-armed neighbour Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, represents a remarkable discontinuity in international affairs — possibly the greatest since the Second World War.

Far away in Australia, we feel the ripple effects of Moscow's actions, which violate the key principles of the international system. At this troubling moment, the 2022 Lowy Institute Poll captures the mood of our country.

The issues that Australians have seen as threats in recent years — Covid-19, climate change and cyberattacks — have been eclipsed by anxiety about Russia's foreign policies.

Almost all Australians are concerned by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Our confidence in Russia's President Vladimir Putin has fallen to the same levels as that placed in North Korea's Kim Jong-un. Russia is the country that Australians trust the least.

By contrast, Australians feel very warmly towards Ukraine. Has any country ever remade its global reputation more surely and swiftly than Ukraine? Most Australians favour the welcoming of Ukrainian refugees, the provision of military aid to the war effort and the sanctioning of Russia.

The growing cooperation between Russia and China is of great concern to many Australians. Australians see China's foreign policy as a critical threat. Their trust in China continues to fall, and in a dramatic shift, three-quarters of Australians see China as posing a military threat to Australia in the years to come.

The news of a security agreement between China and Solomon Islands also struck a chord for many.

Most Australians see a Chinese military base in the Pacific as concerning, and support the deployment of foreign aid to limit China's influence in the Pacific.

Australians are increasingly concerned about the potential for great-power competition to spill over into confrontation. The possibility for a war over Taiwan continues to grow as a threat in the Australian mind. This year, for the first time, a majority would support the involvement of the Australian Defence Force if Taiwan were invaded and the United States went to Taiwan's defence.

The recent behaviour of Russia and China has focused the mind on the differences between authoritarian and democratic systems. Australian support for democracy is at a high watermark in 2022, and a majority of Australians see the rise of authoritarianism as a critical threat to our interests.

In 2022, Australians report feeling unsafe, and as the potential for conflict in our region feels more possible, support for Australia's alliance with the United States has returned to a record high.

The majority of Australians now support increased defence spending and Australia's plans to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. Around half say the AUKUS partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States will make Australia and our region safer.

Australia's relations with the world are now, of course, the responsibility of the new Labor government. The Lowy Institute Poll, in its eighteenth year, reveals that Australians are looking at the world with some concern.

Dr Michael Fullilove
Executive Director
June 2022

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Trust in global powers

Only 5% of Australians say they trust Russia ‘somewhat’ or ‘a great deal’ to act responsibly in the world, a 21-point fall from 2021. One in ten (12%) trust China, a 40-point decrease since 2018. Around half trust India (56%) and Indonesia (51%). Trust in the United States is stable from last year at 65%, but remains 18 points below the levels of trust expressed towards the United States in 2009 and 2011 (83%). Most Australians trust France (82%), Japan (87%) and the United Kingdom (87%) to act responsibly in the world.

Confidence in world leaders

A small fraction of Australians (6%) say they have ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ confidence in Russia’s President Vladimir Putin to do the right thing regarding world affairs, a ten-point decline since 2021. North Korea’s Kim Jong-un inspires confidence in 5% of Australians. Only 11% have confidence in China’s President Xi Jinping. A third of Australians (32%) have confidence in Indonesian President Joko Widodo, a six-point increase from 2021. Four in ten Australians (38%) have confidence in Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Six in ten Australians have confidence in UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson (59%) and in US President Joe Biden (58%), though Biden’s result has declined 11 points since 2021. The Prime Minister of Japan, Fumio Kishida (65%), and French President Emmanuel Macron (67%) both elicit high levels of confidence. Most Australians (87%) express confidence in New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern.

Safety and threats to Australia’s interests

The majority of Australians (53%) say they feel ‘very safe’ or ‘safe’, a 17-point drop from 2021. Seven in ten Australians (68%) say Russia’s foreign policy poses ‘a critical threat’ to the vital interests of Australia in the next ten years, up 36 points since 2017.

The majority of Australians (65%) see China’s foreign policy as a critical threat, up 29 points from 2017. A similar number (64%) say a military conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan poses a critical threat, a 12-point increase from 2021. Many Australians also see cyberattacks from other countries (64%), climate change (62%) and North Korea’s nuclear program (58%) as critical threats.

More than half (55%) say the rise of authoritarian systems of government around the world poses a critical threat, a 14-point increase since 2020. The same number (55%) say that a severe

downturn in the global economy poses a critical threat, a five-point increase from 2021. Less than half (42%) see Covid-19 and other potential epidemics as a critical threat, down 34 points since 2020. Only a third of Australians (34%) see political instability in the United States as a critical threat.

A bare majority of Australians (51%) say they would be in favour of using the Australian military ‘if China invaded Taiwan and the United States decided to intervene’, an increase of eight points since 2019. Four in ten Australians (40%) are in favour of deploying the military ‘if Russia invaded one of its neighbours’, a nine-point increase from 2017.

AUKUS and the Quad

A slim majority of Australians (52%) say AUKUS, the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, will make Australia safer, while 22% say AUKUS will make no difference and 7% say the partnership will make Australia less safe. Around half (49%) say AUKUS will make the region safer, while 11% are unsure about AUKUS and 8% say they have never heard of AUKUS.

Half the population (51%) say Australia should increase defence spending, a 20-point increase since 2019. Seven in ten Australians (70%) are ‘strongly’ or ‘somewhat’ in favour of Australia’s plan to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, while 28% say they are against the acquisition. A third (36%) say they are strongly or somewhat in favour of ‘Australia acquiring nuclear weapons in the future’, while 63% are either somewhat or strongly against the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

A slim majority of Australians say the Quad, a partnership between Australia, India, Japan and the United States, will make Australia (53%) and our region (52%) safer. One in five Australians say the Quad will make no difference to Australia (20%) or to the region (21%). Only a small proportion say the Quad will make Australia (4%) or the region (5%) less safe. One in ten Australians are unsure about the Quad’s impact on Australia (10%) and the region (11%), and 12% of Australians have never heard of the Quad.

Following the AUKUS agreement, around half of Australians (49%) say both countries are equally to blame for the tensions in the Australia–France relationship. A third (35%) say Australia is more to blame, and 12% say France is more to blame.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Almost all Australians (92%) say they are ‘very’ or ‘somewhat concerned’ about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, according to a separate April 2022 survey. Most Australians (87%) also say they are concerned about China–Russia cooperation. Seven in ten Australians (72%) say they are very or somewhat concerned about India–Russia cooperation. The vast majority strongly or somewhat support ‘admitting Ukrainian refugees into Australia’ (90%), ‘keeping strict sanctions on Russia’ (89%) and ‘providing military aid to Ukraine’ (83%).

China and the United States

Three-quarters (75%) in 2022 say it is 'very' or 'somewhat' likely that China will become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years, an increase of 29 points since 2018. Six in ten (63%) say China is 'more of a security threat' to Australia, while 33% say China is 'more of an economic partner' to Australia.

Nine in ten Australians (87%) say the ANZUS alliance is 'very important' or 'fairly important' to Australia's security, a nine-point increase from 2021. Three-quarters (77%) agree that 'Australia's alliance with the United States makes it more likely Australia will be drawn into a war in Asia that would not be in Australia's interests', up eight points from 2019. Two-thirds (64%) agree that 'the alliance relationship with the United States makes Australia safer from attack or pressure from China', an eight-point increase from 2019.

A bare majority (51%) say that Australia should remain neutral in the event of a military conflict between China and the United States, a six-point fall since 2021. Almost half (46%) say Australia should support the United States in such a conflict, a five-point increase from last year. Only 1% say that Australia should support China.

Democracy at home and abroad

In 2022, three-quarters of Australians (74%) say 'democracy is preferable to any other kind of government', an increase of 12 points from 2018 and a record high in the history of the Lowy Institute Poll. One in five Australians (18%) say 'in some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable'. Only 7% say 'for someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have'.

Economic outlook, globalisation and trade

Six in ten Australians (62%) say they are 'very optimistic' or 'optimistic' about Australia's economic performance in the world over the next five years, a 17-point fall from 2021. Three-quarters of Australians (73%) say globalisation is 'mostly good' for Australia. The majority say free trade is good for their standard of living (80%, up five points from 2019), for the Australian economy (78%, a seven-point increase from 2019), for Australian companies (71%, a six-point increase from 2019) and for 'creating jobs in Australia' (66%, a five-point increase since 2019).

Covid-19 pandemic and immigration

Most Australians see New Zealand (92%), Singapore (84%) and Australia (80%) as having handled the pandemic 'very well' or 'fairly well'. Less than half (45%) say China has handled Covid-19 well. A minority of Australians say the United Kingdom (39%, up 20 points from 2021) and the United States (25%, up 18 points from 2021) performed well during the pandemic.

Less than half (46%) say that the number of immigrants allowed into Australia should be 'around the same as pre-Covid levels'. A third of Australians (33%) say immigration should be 'lower

than pre-Covid levels', while 21% say 'higher than pre-Covid levels'. Seven in ten Australians (68%) say 'Australia's openness to people from all over the world is essential to who we are as a nation', a 15-point increase from 2018. A third (31%) say 'if Australia is too open to people from all over the world, we risk losing our identity as a nation', down ten points since 2018.

Climate change and energy

Six in ten Australians (60%) say 'global warming is a serious and pressing problem' about which 'we should begin taking steps now even if this involves significant costs'. Three in ten (29%) say the 'problem of global warming should be addressed, but its effects will be gradual, so we can deal with the problem gradually by taking steps that are low in cost', while 10% say that 'until we are sure that global warming is really a problem, we should not take any steps that would have economic costs'.

The vast majority of Australians support federal government subsidies for renewable energy technology (90%), committing to a more ambitious emissions target for 2030 (77%) and Australia hosting a United Nations Climate Conference (75%). More than half support reducing coal exports to other countries (65%), introducing an emissions trading scheme or carbon tax (64%) and banning new coal mines (63%). Increasing the use of gas (59%) and removing the ban on nuclear power (52%) also receive majority support. Only a third (33%) support subsidising new coal-fired power plants.

Foreign aid to the Pacific

Almost all Australians are in favour of providing aid to the Pacific for disaster relief (93%), Covid-19 vaccines (86%) and for long-term economic development (84%). Eight in ten (82%) favour providing aid to help prevent China from increasing its influence in the Pacific, while 88% are either 'very' or 'somewhat' concerned about China potentially opening a military base in a Pacific Island country. Three-quarters of Australians (75%) are in favour of providing aid to Pacific Island states for climate change action.

Feelings thermometer

Russia sits at the bottom of the Lowy Institute 'feelings thermometer' at a very cool 19°, a 22-degree drop in a single year. Feelings towards China remain cool at 33°. Australians feel warmly towards regional partners including Indonesia (57°), Papua New Guinea (61°), South Korea (63°), Taiwan (64°) and Vietnam (64°). Views of the United States have warmed three degrees to 65°. Australians feel warmly towards Ukraine and France (both 69°). Feelings towards Japan (74°), the United Kingdom (77°) and Canada (80°) remain very warm. In 2022, New Zealand again leads the Lowy Institute feelings thermometer, receiving a very warm 86°.

The Lowy Institute Poll reports the results of a nationally representative online and telephone survey conducted by the Social Research Centre (SRC) between 15 and 28 March 2022, with a sample size of 2006 Australian adults. On a simple random sample of 2006 responses, the margin of error is 2.2%. The design effect for this survey is estimated at 1.77. See Methodology, p.49.

GLOBAL POWERS AND WORLD LEADERS

Trust in global powers

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Australian views of Russia have plummeted. Only 5% of Australians say they trust Russia 'somewhat' or 'a great deal' to act responsibly in the world. This represents a 21-point fall from 2021, and marks Russia displacing China as the least trusted country for Australians.

Most Australians continue to hold very low levels of trust in China, with 12% saying they trust China somewhat or a great deal, a 40-point decrease since 2018. A bare majority of Australians (51%) trust Indonesia, which is steady from 2021. Trust in India has declined somewhat, with 56% saying they trust India to act responsibly in the world, a five-point fall in the past year.

Trust in the United States has rebounded from its historic low levels in 2019 and 2020. Two-thirds of Australians (65%) trust the United States to act responsibly. This result is stable from 2021, but remains 18 points below the levels of trust expressed towards the United States in 2009 and 2011 (83%).

Japan and the United Kingdom rank at the top of the list of countries in 2022, with 87% of Australians saying they trust Japan and the United Kingdom to act responsibly in the world. Despite recent tensions in Australia's relationship with France following the AUKUS announcement, eight in ten Australians (82%) trust France to act responsibly in the world. This remains steady from 2018, the last time that France was included in this list.

FIGURE 1

Trust in global powers

How much do you trust the following countries to act responsibly in the world?





FIGURE 2**Confidence in world leaders**

Here is a list of political leaders. For each, please indicate how much confidence you have in the leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs — a lot of confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence or no confidence at all.

**Confidence in world leaders**

The dramatic decline in trust in Russia corresponds with many Australians losing confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin. Only 6% of Australians say they have 'a lot' or 'some' confidence in Putin to do the right thing regarding world affairs, which marks a ten-point decline since 2021. This places him at the same level as North Korea's Kim Jong-un, who also inspires confidence in only 5% of Australians.

Only 11% of Australians say they have a lot or some confidence in President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs. This figure has halved since 2020 (22%) and has fallen by 32 points since 2018 (43%).

New Zealand's Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern tops the list of global leaders again, with 87% expressing confidence in her (though this has fallen four points from 2021). This aligns with New Zealand's retention of its traditional place at the top of the annual

'feelings thermometer', ranking again as the country about which Australians feel most warmly.

Despite the bilateral tensions between Australia and France, the majority of Australians (67%) express confidence in French President Emmanuel Macron. Australians also hold high levels of confidence in Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, with 65% saying they have confidence in him. Six in ten Australians (59%) have confidence in Boris Johnson, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, which is unchanged from 2021.

While trust and warmth towards the United States have increased in 2022, fewer Australians express confidence in US President Joe Biden than in 2021. Six in ten Australians (58%) say they have some or a lot of confidence in President Biden, an 11-point decrease from his inauguration year of 2021. This remains 28 points above the confidence expressed in former President Donald Trump in 2020 (30%).

Most Australians continue to hold little confidence in key regional leaders. Four in ten Australians (38%) have confidence in Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which has not changed in the past year. A third of Australians (32%) have confidence in Indonesian President Joko Widodo, a six-point increase from 2021.

Almost no Australians have confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin

Australia's best friends

When thinking about Australia's best friend in the world, the majority of Australians (57%) agree that it is New Zealand — a view that has been held firmly since 2017, but that represents an increase of 25 points since the question was first posed in 2014. The United States ranks second as Australia's best friend, with 26%, an increase of six points since 2019. The United Kingdom comes in third place at 13%. Only 1% say China is Australia's best friend in the world, an eight-point decline since 2014.

Australians are increasingly likely to name Japan as their best friend in Asia, while the number who see China as a best friend in the region has declined dramatically. Four in ten Australians (43%) say Japan is Australia's best friend in Asia, an increase of 18 points since 2016. One in five (21%) name Singapore as Australia's best friend in Asia, an increase of nine points since 2016, and 15% choose Indonesia. The remaining countries receive results in the single digits, with 7% saying India is Australia's best friend in Asia, and 4% naming South Korea. Only 6% of Australians say China is Australia's best friend in Asia, a decline of 24 points since 2016.

FIGURE 3

Australia's best friend in the world

Now about Australia's relations with other countries around the world. In your personal opinion, which one of the following countries is Australia's best friend in the world?





FIGURE 4

Australia's best friend in Asia

Thinking about Australia's relations in Asia. In your personal opinion, which one of the following countries is Australia's best friend in Asia?



SAFETY AND THREATS TO AUSTRALIA'S INTERESTS


Feelings of safety

Australians' sense of safety has been up and down in recent years as people have reacted to the course of the pandemic and to global uncertainty. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and instability closer to home also appear to be having an effect on public opinion, with the survey fielded in March, soon after the war in Ukraine started. In 2022, a bare majority of Australians (53%) say they feel 'very safe' or 'safe', a 17-point drop from 2021 (70%). This is only marginally higher than the record low of Australians feeling safe in 2020, during the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic. This year's result is a striking 39 points below the high point of feelings of safety in 2008 and 2010 (92%).

FIGURE 5

Feelings of safety

Now about world events, how safe do you feel?



Threats to Australia's vital interests

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has had a clear impact on threat perceptions for many Australians. Russia's foreign policy tops the list of threats in 2022, with 68% of Australians saying Russia's foreign policy poses a critical threat to the vital interests of Australia in the next ten years. This marks a striking 36-point increase since 2017 (32%).

At the same time, Australians are also concerned about China and the potential for conflict in the Taiwan Strait. More than six in ten Australians (65%) say China's foreign policy poses a critical threat to Australia's vital interests, a 29-point increase from 2017 (36%). Concern about military conflict between the United States and China — the world's two superpowers — has been on an upward trajectory in Australia. In 2022, 64% of Australians say 'a military conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan' poses a critical threat, a 12-point increase from 2021 (52%) and 29 points higher than in 2020 (35%).

While anxiety about Russia and China has overtaken many threats, Australians continue to express a high level of concern over other non-traditional security threats. Two-thirds of the population (64%) say 'cyberattacks from other countries' pose a critical threat to Australia's vital interests. A similar number of Australians (62%) say climate change poses a critical threat, steady from last year.

By contrast, Australians' concern about 'Covid-19 and other potential epidemics' continues on a downward trajectory. In 2022, only 42% say Covid-19 and other potential epidemics pose a critical threat to Australia's vital interests in the next ten years. This marks a dramatic 17-point fall from 2021 (59%), and is 34 points below the 2020 result (76%) at the outset of the pandemic.

As North Korea continues to enhance its nuclear weapons capabilities, the majority of Australians (58%) consider North Korea's nuclear program to be a critical threat. A smaller proportion of Australians (48%) view international terrorism as a critical threat.

At a time of record levels of support for democracy, Australians are increasingly concerned about rising authoritarianism. In 2022, a majority (55%) say 'the rise of authoritarian systems of government around the world' poses a critical threat to Australia's vital interests, a substantial 14-point increase since 2020 (41%). However, concern about 'foreign interference in Australian politics' has stabilised, with 49% saying foreign interference poses a critical threat.

The Australian public appear to be increasingly concerned about the economy, with 55% saying 'a severe downturn in the global economy' poses a critical threat to Australia's interests, which has risen five points since 2021 (50%).

Russia's foreign policy is seen as the top threat to Australia's vital interests

Only a third of Australians (34%) regard 'political instability in the United States' as a critical threat. However, a majority (56%) say political instability in Australia's treaty ally poses 'an important but not critical' threat.

FIGURE 6

Threats to Australia's vital interests

Here is a list of possible threats to the vital interests of Australia in the next ten years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all.






FIGURE 7
Threats to Australia's vital interests: selected

Here is a list of possible threats to the vital interests of Australia in the next ten years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all.

% who say a critical threat


FIGURE 8
Foreign influence

Are you personally concerned or not concerned about the influence of each of the following countries on Australia's political processes?


Foreign influence in Australia's political processes

Many Australians continue to express concern about foreign influence on the country's political processes. Eight in ten Australians (86%) say they are concerned about China's influence on Australia's political processes, a four-point increase from 2020, and 23 points higher than the level of concern expressed in 2018. Fewer Australians, though still a majority (54%), express concern about the influence of the United States on Australia's political processes, a seven-point decline since 2020.

SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

AUKUS and the Quad

On 16 September 2021, the leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States announced the creation of a trilateral security partnership called AUKUS. A slim majority of Australians (52%) say AUKUS will make Australia safer. Around one in five (22%) say AUKUS will make no difference to Australia's safety, and 7% say the partnership will make Australia less safe. There are partisan differences to these responses: 70% of Australians who lean towards the Liberal and National parties say AUKUS will make Australia safer, a view shared by only 47% of Australians who lean towards the Labor Party and 44% who lean towards the Greens.

Around half say the AUKUS agreement will make Australia and the region safer

Australians appear to see the implications of AUKUS in the region in a similar light. Around half (49%) say AUKUS will make the region more safe, 24% say the partnership will make no difference, and 8% say it will make the region less safe. A minority of Australians (11%) say they are not sure about AUKUS, and a similar proportion (8%) say they have never heard of AUKUS.

In 2021, the leaders of Australia, India, Japan and the United States convened in person as the Quad grouping. A slim majority of Australians say the Quad will make Australia (53%) and our region (52%) safer. One in five Australians say the Quad will make no difference to Australia (20%) or to the region (21%). Only a small proportion of Australians say the Quad will make Australia (4%) or the region (5%) less safe. One in ten Australians are unsure about the Quad's impact on Australia (10%) and the region (11%), and 12% of Australians have never heard of the Quad. The Quad Leaders' Tokyo Summit took place in May 2022, after the fieldwork for this poll had been completed.

FIGURE 9

AUKUS

Thinking now about Australia's partnerships in the world. Do you think AUKUS, the security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, will make Australia/our region more safe, less safe or make no difference?





FIGURE 10

The Quad

Do you think the Quad, the partnership between Australia, India, Japan and the United States, will make Australia/our region more safe, less safe or make no difference?



Nuclear-powered submarines and nuclear weapons

The first announcement under AUKUS was Australia's plan to acquire at least eight nuclear-powered submarines for operation by the Royal Australian Navy. Seven in ten Australians (70%) are strongly or somewhat in favour of this decision, while 28% say they are against the acquisition. This comes at a time when the number of Australians who want defence spending to be increased has jumped 20 points since 2019 to 51% (see p.28.).

The AUKUS initiative was announced by the former Coalition government. The acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines receives strong support from Australians who lean towards the Liberal and National parties (87%), while 65% of Australians who lean towards the Labor Party are in favour of the decision. Only 42% of Australians who lean towards the Greens are in favour of the acquisition.

FIGURE 11

Acquiring nuclear-powered submarines

Now a question about submarines that are powered by nuclear energy, but do not have nuclear weapons. Are you in favour or against Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines?





FIGURE 12

Acquiring nuclear weapons

Thinking now about Australia's defence. Would you be in favour or against Australia acquiring nuclear weapons in the future?




In 2022, 36% of Australians are strongly or somewhat in favour of 'Australia acquiring nuclear weapons in the future', while 63% are either somewhat or strongly against the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Seven in ten Australians are in favour of Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines

In the 2010 Lowy Institute Poll, responding to a different question, only 16% of Australians said they would support acquiring nuclear weapons 'if some of Australia's near neighbours were to begin to develop nuclear weapons'.

FIGURE 13**Foreign military based in Australia**

Are you personally in favour or against Australia allowing the following countries to base military forces here in Australia?

**Foreign military in Australia**


As the United States is committing to send more platforms to Australia, 63% of Australians are either strongly or somewhat in favour of allowing the United States 'to base military forces here in Australia'. This is an increase of eight points since 2011, when the former Prime Minister Julia Gillard and President Barack Obama announced the first rotation of US troops through Darwin. Even more Australians (67%) are in favour of the United Kingdom basing military forces in Australia.

Australia–France relations

The announcement of the AUKUS partnership saw Australia cancel plans to acquire submarines from the French contractor Naval Group. This led to tensions in the bilateral relationship between Australia and France. Around half of Australians (49%) say both countries are equally to blame for the tensions in the Australia–France relationship. A third (35%) say Australia is more to blame, and 12% say France is more to blame. Australians also continue to hold high levels of trust in France and confidence in French President Macron (see p.6 and 7.).

FIGURE 14**Tensions in the Australia–France relationship**

Now thinking about Australia's relationship with France. Which country is more to blame for the tensions in the Australia–France relationship?



Use of Australian military forces

As Australians increasingly express concern about a potential conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan, a slim majority of Australians (51%) would favour using the Australian military 'if China invaded Taiwan and the United States decided to intervene'. This marks an eight-point increase since the question was last asked in 2019.

Four in ten Australians (40%) say Australia should deploy its military 'if Russia invaded one of its neighbours'. This is nine points higher than in 2017.

Eight in ten (79%) support using the military 'to stop a government from committing genocide and killing large numbers of its own people'.

Three-quarters of Australians (75%) support using Australia's military 'to restore law and order in a Pacific nation'.


As in previous years, the majority of Australians (60%) support the Australian military being used 'to conduct freedom of navigation naval operations in the South China Sea and other disputed areas claimed by China'.

However, the willingness of Australians to support deployment of the military to the Middle East has declined in recent years. Four in ten Australians (41%) say the Australian military should be used 'to fight against violent extremist groups in the Middle East', a nine-point decline from 2019 and 20 points lower than the level of support in 2017.

FIGURE 15

Use of Australian military forces

Now about Australian military forces. There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using Australian military forces in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about the following situations. Would you personally be in favour or against the use of Australian military forces:



In 2017, the question asked was: 'In response to China's increasing military activities in the South China Sea, the United States has been conducting military operations designed to ensure freedom of navigation in the region. Are you personally in favour or against Australia conducting similar operations in an effort to ensure freedom of navigation in the South China Sea? In 2017 and 2019, the question asked was: 'To fight against violent extremist groups in Iraq and Syria'.

RUSSIA’S INVASION OF UKRAINE

Concern about Russian foreign policy

Australians have watched Russia’s invasion of Ukraine closely, and express very high levels of concern about the war. In a separate April 2022 survey, almost all Australians (92%) say they are ‘very’ or ‘somewhat concerned’ about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Of this number, a sizeable 69% say they are ‘very concerned’ by the invasion.

In February 2022, the leaders of Russia and China held a high-level summit, prior to Russia invading Ukraine. Most Australians (87%) say they are concerned about China–Russia cooperation, with

a majority (56%) saying they are ‘very concerned’ about the relationship between the two countries.

Looking at the relationship between Russia and India, seven in ten Australians (72%) say they are very or somewhat concerned about India–Russia cooperation. Only 28% of Australians say they are ‘very concerned’ by this partnership.

These high levels of concern align with Australian reactions to Russia across the entire 2022 Lowy Institute Poll. This year, 68% of Australians say Russia’s foreign policy poses a critical threat to Australia’s interests, putting Russia at the top of the list of threats. This represents a remarkable 36-point

FIGURE 16
Concern about world events: Russia

Now thinking about world events. To what extent are you concerned or not concerned about:


Russia’s invasion of Ukraine



China–Russia cooperation



India–Russia cooperation



Almost all Australians support accepting Ukrainian refugees to Australia

jump since 2017 (see p.9.). At the same time, only 6% of Australians express confidence in Russia's President Putin, and 5% trust Russia to act responsibly in the world (see p.6 and 7.).


Russia also sits at the bottom of the Lowy Institute 'feelings thermometer' for the first time, registering an icy 19°, a 22-degree drop in a single year. By contrast, Ukraine receives a very warm reading of 69°, 18 degrees higher than the last time it featured on the thermometer in 2015 (see p.31.).

Australia's response to the war in Ukraine

Australians are broadly supportive of the policies that the Australian government has put in place following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Nine in ten Australians (90%) say they strongly or somewhat support 'admitting Ukrainian refugees into Australia'. The same proportion of Australians (89%) support 'keeping strict sanctions on Russia'. A large majority of Australians (83%) also support Australia 'providing military aid to Ukraine'.

FIGURE 17
Australia's response to the war in Ukraine

Thinking more about Russia's invasion of Ukraine, would you support or oppose Australia:



RELATIONS WITH SUPERPOWERS: CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

China

As Australia's relationship with China has declined, public opinion towards China has fallen sharply. In recent years, Australians have increasingly viewed China's economic growth as a negative, while they have historically been concerned about China's human rights record and military.

Trust, warmth and confidence in China and China's leader started to decline in 2017, and continue to remain at record lows in 2022. There is also increased concern about the potential for China to pose a military threat in the region and to Australia.

In 2022, a substantial number of Australians are concerned about China becoming a military threat to Australia. Setting a new record by some margin, three-quarters of Australians (75%) say it is very or somewhat likely that China will become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years, an increase of 29 points since 2018.

As well as a military threat, many Australians see China as a security threat. In 2022, two-thirds of Australians (63%) say China is 'more of a security threat' to Australia, while 33% say China is 'more of an economic partner' to Australia. Both of these figures have not changed since 2021.

The United States

The public has reported high levels of support for Australia's alliance with the United States over the 18 years of the Lowy Institute Poll, despite fluctuating levels of trust in the United States and confidence in US leaders.

Australians increasingly see conflict in our region as a possibility, which likely adds to the importance placed upon the alliance with the United States (see p.9). But there are also some concerns about the implications of Australia's relationship with the United States.

FIGURE 18

China as a military threat

Do you think it is likely or unlikely that China will become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years?





FIGURE 19

China: economic partner or security threat

In your own view, is China more of an economic partner or more of a security threat to Australia?



In 2022, the number of Australians who see the ANZUS alliance as important to their security has returned to record highs. Nine in ten Australians (87%) say the alliance is 'very important' or 'fairly important' to Australia's security. This marks a nine-point increase from 2021, and is equal to the highest levels of support expressed in 2012, during former President Barack Obama's administration.


Support for Australia's alliance with the United States has returned to its high watermark in 2022

However, warmth towards and trust in the United States have not returned to the high levels that were recorded during the Obama years (see p.6.). More than three-quarters of Australians (77%) now agree that 'Australia's alliance with the United States makes it more likely Australia will be drawn into a war in Asia that would not be in Australia's interests', an increase of eight points since 2019. However, a similar number (76%) also agree that the United States would come to Australia's defence if Australia were under threat. Two-thirds (64%) agree that 'the alliance relationship with the United States makes Australia safer from attack or pressure from China', an eight-point increase from 2019.

FIGURE 20


Importance of the US alliance

How important is our alliance relationship with the United States for Australia's security?


FIGURE 21

Attitudes to the United States

I am now going to read you some different arguments about the alliance relationship with the United States. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree.



Military conflict between the United States and China

As Australians are increasingly concerned about potential conflict in the region (see p.9.), a bare majority (51%) say that Australia should remain neutral in the event of a military conflict between China and the United States. This figure has fallen six points since 2021. Almost half (46%) say Australia should support the United States in such a conflict, a five-point increase from last year. Only 1% say Australia should support China.

As in 2021, there is a generational difference on this question. More than half the population aged over 45 (55%) say Australia should support the United States, while only 36% of Australians aged 18–44 agree with that approach. Younger Australians are more likely to say Australia should remain neutral, with six in ten Australians aged 18–44 (60%) choosing this position. Only 43% of Australians aged 45 and over prefer neutrality.

DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD

Democracies around the world

At a time when Australian leaders are increasingly discussing the importance of liberal democracies, Australians are more likely than ever to be aware of other democracies in the region. There have been substantial increases in the number of Australians who agree that Taiwan, India, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea are democracies. At the same time, the number of Australians who agree that Hong Kong and China are democracies has declined.

Australians continue to see traditional partners as democracies. The vast majority of Australians (92%) agree that the United Kingdom is a democracy. The percentage of Australians who see the United States as a democracy has increased six points from 2020 to 87%. More Australians in 2022

FIGURE 22 Military conflict between China and the United States





FIGURE 23 Democracies around the world



also see Japan as a democracy (84%), an increase of five points from 2020. More Australians also now see Japan as Australia's best friend in Asia (see p.8.).

In line with Australians' increasing concerns about a conflict over Taiwan (see p.9.), seven in ten (68%) now agree that Taiwan is a democracy, an increase of 16 points from 2020. While trust in India has declined in the past year (see p.6.), seven in ten Australians (68%) see India as a democracy, up 11 points from 2020. Six in ten Australians (63%) also say Papua New Guinea is a democracy, a ten-point increase from 2020.

The Lowy Institute Poll has surveyed Australians on their views about Indonesia for 18 years, and their responses have started to demonstrate growing awareness about our largest neighbour. Lowy Institute polling has consistently shown that most Australians do not view Indonesia as a democracy. In 2022, the level of awareness about Indonesia as a democracy has reached a new record high, with 48% agreeing Indonesia is a democracy, a nine-point increase from 2020.

After a year in which media groups have been shut down and elections limited, fewer Australians (28%)

see Hong Kong as a democracy, a decline of nine points since 2020. Only 7% of Australians agree that China is a democracy, a three-point fall from 2020.

Attitudes to democracy


In 2022, Australians' preference for democracy has reached a record high. Three-quarters of Australians (74%) say 'democracy is preferable to any other kind of government', an increase of nine points from 2019. One in five (18%) say that 'in some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable'. In an election year in Australia, only 7% say 'for someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have', the lowest level in the history of the Lowy Institute Poll.

The gap between older and younger Australians on the importance of democracy — prominent in previous Lowy Institute polling — appears to have almost disappeared. In 2022, seven in ten Australians aged 18–29 (70%) express a preference for democracy, compared with 74% of Australians aged over 30. In previous years, this gap has been as large as 28 points.

FIGURE 24

Democracy in Australia

Now a question about democracy. Below are some statements about democracy. Please indicate which one of the three statements comes closest to your own personal views about democracy.



ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, GLOBALISATION AND TRADE

Economic optimism

Along with increased concerns about safety and security, Australians have downgraded their view of Australia's economic prospects. In 2022, six in ten Australians (62%) say they are 'very optimistic' or 'optimistic' about Australia's economic performance in the world over the next five years. This represents a 17-point fall from 2021, but remains ten points ahead of the record low in economic optimism experienced by Australians in the early days of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 at 52%.

Levels of optimism about the economy in the Australian public have often mirrored Australian perceptions of the global economy. In 2022, the majority of Australians (55%) say 'a severe downturn in the global economy' poses a critical threat to Australia's interests, which has risen five points since 2021, but remains 16 points below the record high of 71% in 2020 (see p.10.).

Globalisation


Australians have generally rejected the global trend towards protectionist and anti-globalisation sentiments experienced in other countries over the past decade. This continues in 2022, despite the ongoing pandemic and increases in the cost of living in Australia. Seven in ten Australians (73%) continue to say globalisation is mostly good for Australia, a marginal three-point increase from 2020. This result remains six points below 2009, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, where 79% of Australians said globalisation was mostly good.

Only a small gap exists between urban and regional residents on this question. Three-quarters of Australians who live in urban areas (75%) say globalisation is mostly good for Australia, whereas this view is held by 69% of Australians who live in regional or rural areas.

FIGURE 25

Optimism about Australia's economic performance

Thinking about Australia's economic performance in the world. Overall, how optimistic are you about Australia's economic performance in the world over the next five years?



Free trade

Support for free trade continues to be on an upward trajectory in Australia. Eight in ten Australians (80%) say free trade is good for their standard of living, a five-point increase from 2019. More than seven in ten Australians say free trade is good for the Australian economy (78%, a seven-point increase from 2019) and for Australian companies (71%, a six-point increase from 2019). Two-thirds of Australians (66%) also say that free trade is good for 'creating jobs in Australia', a five-point increase since 2019.

FIGURE 26

Globalisation

Now on globalisation. Do you believe that globalisation, especially the increasing connections of our economy with others around the world, is mostly good or mostly bad for Australia?





FIGURE 27

Attitudes to free trade

Overall, do you personally think free trade is good or bad for each of the following:



COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND IMMIGRATION

Covid-19 handling

Australians are now far less likely to see Covid-19 as a threat to Australia's interests than in previous years (see p.9.) Public attitudes towards various countries' approaches to the pandemic have also shifted. Australians are overwhelmingly positive about New Zealand's handling of the pandemic, with 92% saying they have handled it 'very well' or 'fairly well'. Most Australians (84%) say Singapore has also handled the pandemic well.

Eight in ten Australians (80%) continue to say that Australia has handled the pandemic well, though this is a 15-point decline from 2021. The strength of that sentiment has also shifted substantially, with only 24% of Australians saying that Australia has handled the pandemic 'very well' in 2022, compared to 65% in 2021.


Australians have mixed views of China's handling of the pandemic, with 45% saying China has handled Covid-19 well and 54% saying it has been handled badly. The number of Australians who say China has handled Covid-19 well is unchanged since 2021, but is 14 points higher than Australians' initial response to China's handling of Covid-19 in 2020. The 2022 survey was fielded prior to the recent lockdowns in Shanghai and other cities in China.

In previous polling, Australians have had a very poor view of how the United States and the United Kingdom have handled the pandemic. This has improved in 2022, from a low base. Four in ten (39%) say the United Kingdom has handled the pandemic well, an increase of 20 points from 2021. The United States continues to sit at the bottom of this list of countries, with 25% saying the United States has done well, an 18-point improvement since last year.

FIGURE 28

Global responses to Covid-19

Overall, how well or badly do you think each of the following countries has handled the Covid-19 pandemic so far?



Immigration and openness

Following two years of closed borders during the pandemic, Australians appear to be shifting towards more openness and immigration. Seven in ten Australians (68%) say 'Australia's openness to people from all over the world is essential to who we are as a nation', a 15-point increase from 2018. Fewer Australians (31%) now say 'if Australia is too open to people from all over the world, we risk losing our identity as a nation', a ten-point decline over the past four years.

There is a significant difference across generations on this question. Eight in ten Australians aged 18–44 (79%) see openness as essential to Australia's identity, while this is a view held by 58% of Australians aged over 45.

Post-pandemic immigration

The number of Australians calling for reduced immigration also appears to have declined over the course of the pandemic. When asked about restarting Australia's immigration program now that borders have reopened, 46% say that the number of immigrants allowed into Australia should be 'around the same as pre-Covid levels'. A third of Australians (33%) say immigration should be 'lower than pre-Covid levels', and 21% say 'higher than pre-Covid levels'. In 2019, prior to the pandemic, in response to a different question, 47% of Australians said immigration levels were 'too high', while 40% said the rate of immigration was about right.

FIGURE 29

Immigration and national identity

Next, indicate whether the first statement or the second statement comes closer to your own views, even if neither is exactly right.





FIGURE 30

Post-pandemic immigration

Thinking now about the pause in Australia's immigration during the pandemic. Now that borders have reopened, over the next 12 months, do you think the number of immigrants allowed into Australia should be:



CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY

Global warming

The majority of Australians continue to express concern about climate change in 2022. Six in ten Australians (60%) say ‘global warming is a serious and pressing problem’ about which ‘we should begin taking steps now even if this involves significant costs’. This is unchanged from 2021, and remains eight points below the highest level of concern expressed in 2006 (68%). Three in ten Australians (29%) say the ‘problem of global warming should be addressed, but its effects will be gradual, so we can deal with the problem gradually by taking steps that are low in cost’, while 10% say that ‘until we are sure that global warming is really a problem, we should not take any steps that would have economic costs’.

The number of Australians (62%) who say climate change poses a critical threat to Australia’s vital interests in the next ten years has also remained stable since 2021 (see p.9.). Three-quarters of Australians (75%) support providing aid to Pacific Island states to take action on climate change (see p.29.).

Potential federal government policies on climate change

Looking at a range of possible federal government policies, nine in ten Australians (90%) say they would support the federal government ‘providing subsidies for the development of renewable energy technology’, which is unchanged from 2021.

Eight in ten Australians (77%) support Australia ‘committing to a more ambitious emissions target for 2030’. Three-quarters (75%) say they also support Australia hosting a United Nations Climate Conference. The Labor government said during the election campaign that it would bid to host a COP in partnership with other Pacific nations if it formed government.

A sizeable majority of Australians (64%) support introducing an emissions trading scheme or a carbon tax. These views have shifted significantly in the past six years. In response to a different question in 2016, only 40% said they would prefer the government to introduce an emissions trading scheme or price on carbon.

In recent years, Australian views of coal exports and coal mines have shifted. Six in ten Australians (65%) say they would support reducing Australian coal exports to other countries. In 2016, a majority (66%) said Australia should continue to export coal, in response to a different question.

Six in ten Australians (63%) support introducing a ban on new coal mines opening in Australia, unchanged from 2021. Urban residents are more likely to support a ban on new coal mines, with 66% of Australians in urban areas supporting such a ban, compared to 57% of Australians living in regional and rural areas. In 2022, a third of Australians (33%) say they support the federal government providing subsidies for building new coal-fired power plants.


On a number of these policies, there is a large gap between support from younger and older Australians. For example, 70% of Australians aged 18–44 support banning new coal mines, compared to 57% of Australians aged over 45. Similarly, 71% of respondents aged 18–44 support imposing a carbon tax or emissions trading scheme, compared to 57% of Australians aged over 45.

The majority of Australians (59%) continue to be in favour of ‘increasing the use of gas for Australia’s energy generation’.


Australians are split over the question of nuclear power, which has been prohibited in Australia since 1998. A slim majority (52%) would support removing the existing ban on nuclear power, a five-point increase from 2021. Almost half (45%) would oppose this decision, which represents a six-point decline in the past year.

FIGURE 31
Attitudes to global warming

Now about global warming. There is a controversy over what the countries of the world, including Australia, should do about the problem of global warming. Please indicate which of the following three statements comes closest to your own point of view.


FIGURE 32
Potential federal government policies on climate change

Would you support or oppose the following federal government policies?



AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND FOREIGN AID

Budget priorities

At a time when Australia has made substantial commitments in defence spending, a slim majority of Australians (51%) say defence spending should be increased. This marks a sizeable 20-point increase since 2019 in the proportion of Australians who want to increase defence expenditure.

Nonetheless, Australians continue to prioritise domestic spending over foreign policy issues when considering the federal budget. A large majority of Australians would increase spending in health (83%) and education (69%) if they were making up the budget for the federal government. More than half (56%) say spending on social welfare should be increased, up nine points since 2019.


Australians are divided when it comes to border protection, with 39% saying Australia should increase spending, a seven-point lift since 2019. However, more Australians (44%) say spending on border protection should be kept at about the current level.

Foreign aid has not historically been popular with the Australian public. In 2022, cuts to the aid budget have become less popular. Four in ten (42%) say spending on foreign aid should be kept around current levels, an increase of six points since 2019. A third (34%) continue to say that foreign aid spending should be decreased, representing a 13-point fall since 2019. Around a quarter of Australians (24%) say Australia should increase spending on foreign aid, an increase of seven points since 2019.

FIGURE 33

Budget priorities

Now about the federal budget. If you were making up the budget for the federal government this year, would you personally increase spending, decrease spending or keep spending about the same for:



Foreign aid to the Pacific

While many Australians have been wary of foreign aid in the past, in 2022, Australians are overwhelmingly in favour of Australia providing foreign aid to Pacific Island states. Almost all Australians (93%) are in favour of providing aid for disaster relief. The provision of aid for Covid-19 vaccines also receives high levels of support, with 86% of Australians saying they are in favour. This aligns with attitudes in 2021, where 83% of Australians said Australia should help Pacific countries to pay for Covid-19 vaccines.

There is also strong support for Australia to play a role in building strong economies in the Pacific.


Eight in ten Australians (84%) favour providing aid to the Pacific for long-term economic development, and 82% favour providing aid 'to help prevent China from increasing its influence in the Pacific'. In a different question in 2019, 73% said Australia should try to prevent China from increasing its influence in the Pacific.

Three-quarters of Australians (75%) are in favour of providing aid to Pacific Island states for climate change action. The same number (75%) support Australia hosting a UN Climate Conference, which has been floated as a proposal that could involve Australia co-hosting with Pacific Island nations (see p.27.).

FIGURE 34

Foreign aid to the Pacific

Thinking specifically about foreign aid to Pacific Island nations. Would you personally be in favour or against Australia providing aid for the following purpose:



Potential Chinese military base in the Pacific

The Australian public share the government's concerns about the potential for a Chinese military base in the Pacific. In a nationwide poll in April 2022, 88% of Australians say they are either 'very' or 'somewhat' concerned about 'China potentially opening a military base in a Pacific Island country'. A security agreement between Solomon Islands and China was signed in April during the fieldwork for this poll, and media had also reported on a leaked draft security agreement in late March, prior to fieldwork. In a different question in 2019, a smaller majority of Australians (55%) said China opening a military base in a Pacific Island country would pose a critical threat to Australia's vital interests in the next ten years.

88% are concerned about China opening a military base in the Pacific

Foreign policy priorities

The public hold mixed views on the question of which partners, regions and forums should be the highest priority for Australia's foreign policy. Four in ten Australians (43%) say that 'focusing on Australia's region, including Asia and the Pacific' should be the highest priority for the federal government's foreign policy. A third (33%) prioritise a globalist approach, saying that the government's highest priority should be 'focusing on global cooperation through multilateral institutions, including the United Nations'. Only one in five (20%) say Australia's focus should be on 'cooperation with Western countries and traditional partners, including the United States'.

FIGURE 35

Potential Chinese military base in the Pacific

Now thinking about world events. To what extent are you concerned or not concerned about China potentially opening a military base in a Pacific Island country?




FIGURE 36

Australia's foreign policy priorities

Which of the following should be the highest priority for the federal government's foreign policy?





FIGURE 37**Feelings thermometer**

Please rate your feelings towards some countries and territories, with one hundred meaning a very warm, favourable feeling, zero meaning a very cold, unfavourable feeling, and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold.



FEELINGS THERMOMETER

For the first time, Russia has fallen to the bottom of the Lowy Institute 'feelings thermometer', a measurement of Australians' perceptions about countries, territories and institutions on a scale of 0° (coldest feelings) to 100° (warmest feelings).

Russia registers an icy 19°, a 22-degree drop in a single year, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This represents the greatest single-year fall in the history of the Lowy Institute Poll feelings thermometer.

By contrast, Australians feel very warmly towards Ukraine, with the country receiving a reading of 69°, 18 degrees higher than the last time Ukraine featured on the thermometer in 2015. Australians feel the same level of warmth towards France (69°).

While Russia has replaced China at the bottom of the feelings thermometer, feelings towards China in 2022 remain very cool at 33°. Australian views of Afghanistan following the Taliban takeover of the country remain largely unchanged at a cool 36°. Attitudes towards Myanmar have warmed marginally since 2021, marking a five-degree improvement to reach 46°.

Both India and Indonesia receive warm readings of 57°, marking Indonesia's highest result in 17 years. Australians feel warmly towards the United Nations and the European Union, registering 61° and 62° respectively.

South Korea (63°), Taiwan (64°) and Vietnam (64°) all receive warm readings in 2022. Feelings towards Papua New Guinea are stable at 61°, and Tonga registers 67°. Feelings towards the United States have warmed three degrees to 65° in the second year of the Biden administration.

Feelings towards Japan (74°), the United Kingdom (77°) and Canada (80°) remain very warm in 2022. This year, New Zealand again leads the feelings thermometer, receiving a very warm 86°, steady from 2021.

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Please note that totals may not add to 100% due to rounding. Each response option has been rounded individually and grouped responses (e.g. those who 'somewhat agree' plus 'strongly agree') have not been rounded at the group level. For more information on the methodology of the Lowy Institute Poll, including changes in mode from 2018 onwards, see page 49.

TABLE 1

Trust in global powers

How much do you trust the following countries to act responsibly in the world?

	2022 (ranked by total who trust 'a great deal' and 'somewhat')				
	A great deal	Somewhat	Total: a great deal and somewhat	Not very much	Not at all
United Kingdom	29	58	87	10	3
Japan	27	60	87	10	3
France	19	63	82	15	3
United States	16	49	65	26	9
India	5	51	56	35	8
Indonesia	4	47	51	40	9
China	2	10	12	39	48
Russia	1	4	5	17	77

	A great deal										Total: 'a great deal' and 'somewhat'									
	2006	2008	2009	2011	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2006	2008	2009	2011	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	50	45	-	24	28	29	-	-	-	-	90	90	-	84	87	87
Japan	19	15	33	30	31	33	-	22	29	27	73	68	81	83	86	87	-	82	87	87
France	-	-	-	-	-	29	-	-	-	19	-	-	-	-	-	83	-	-	-	82
United States	19	24	39	40	20	15	14	12	13	16	60	69	83	83	61	55	52	51	61	65
India	9	8	10	7	9	8	-	4	7	5	68	55	61	61	64	59	-	45	61	56
Indonesia	-	-	6	5	5	-	-	2	2	4	-	-	45	46	52	-	-	36	48	51
China	7	7	7	12	8	7	4	4	2	2	60	47	59	60	54	52	32	23	16	12
Russia	-	7	7	7	5	3	-	2	2	1	-	53	59	53	38	28	-	24	26	5

TABLE 2

Confidence in world leaders

Here is a list of political leaders. For each, please indicate how much confidence you have in the leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs — a lot of confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence or no confidence at all.

	2022 (ranked by total saying 'a lot of' and 'some' confidence)						
	A lot	Some	Total: a lot and some confidence	Not too much	None at all	Total: not too much confidence and none at all	Not sure who the person is
New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern	58	29	87	6	5	11	1
French President Emmanuel Macron	15	52	67	17	6	23	5
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida	14	51	65	12	3	15	10
UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson	12	47	59	29	10	39	1
US President Joe Biden	13	45	58	26	14	40	0
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi	4	34	38	28	9	37	15
Indonesian President Joko Widodo	3	29	32	34	10	44	13
Chinese President Xi Jinping	2	9	11	26	56	82	3
Russian President Vladimir Putin	2	4	6	9	83	92	0
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un	2	3	5	12	80	92	1

**Percentage saying 'a lot of' and 'some' confidence
(ranked by 2022 responses)**

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern	–	88	87	91	87
French President Emmanuel Macron	61	–	–	–	67
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (Shinzo Abe 2018-20, Yoshihide Suga 2021)	66	–	73	61	65
UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson (Theresa May 2018)	68	–	55	59	59
US President Joe Biden (Donald Trump 2018-20)	30	25	30	69	58
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi	37	–	42	38	38
Indonesian President Joko Widodo	–	34	32	26	32
Chinese President Xi Jinping	43	30	22	10	11
Russian President Vladimir Putin	19	21	–	16	6
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un	5	7	6	5	5

TABLE 3**Australia's best friend in the world**

Now about Australia's relations with other countries around the world. In your personal opinion, which one of the following countries is Australia's best friend in the world?

	2014 ^a	2017	2019	2022
New Zealand	32	53	59	57
United States	35	17	20	26
United Kingdom	17	17	15	13
China	9	8	4	1
Indonesia	1	1	1	0
Japan	1	2	2	1
None/don't know	0	2	0	2

^aThis question was first asked on behalf of the Lowy Institute by Newspoll in its omnibus survey on 2–4 May 2014.

TABLE 4**Australia's best friend in Asia**

Thinking about Australia's relations in Asia. In your personal opinion, which one of the following countries is Australia's best friend in Asia?

	2014	2016	2022
Japan	28	25	43
Singapore	13	12	21
Indonesia	8	15	15
India	5	6	7
China	29	30	6
South Korea	5	4	4
None/don't know	11	9	3

TABLE 5**Feelings of safety**

Now about world events, how safe do you feel?

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2015	2017	2018	2020	2021	2022
Very safe	30	30	40	35	44	42	24	20	18	4	6	6
Safe	61	56	50	57	46	50	56	59	60	46	64	47
Total: safe	91	86	90	92	90	92	80	79	78	50	70	53
Unsafe	7	10	8	8	7	5	16	16	20	41	27	40
Very unsafe	1	3	1	1	2	2	3	5	1	9	3	6
Total: unsafe	8	13	9	9	9	7	19	21	21	50	30	46
Don't know/no view	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1

TABLE 6**Threats to Australia's vital interests**

Here is a list of possible threats to the vital interests of Australia in the next ten years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all.

	2022 (ranked by percentage saying 'critical threat')			
	Critical threat	An important but not critical threat	Not an important threat at all	Don't know/no view
Russia's foreign policy	68	26	5	0
China's foreign policy	65	32	3	1
Cyberattacks from other countries	64	33	3	0
A military conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan	64	32	4	0
Climate change	62	27	11	0
North Korea's nuclear program	58	35	7	0
A severe downturn in the global economy	55	42	3	0
The rise of authoritarian systems of government around the world	55	40	4	0
Foreign interference in Australian politics	49	45	6	0
International terrorism	48	45	7	0
Covid-19 and other potential epidemics	42	48	9	0
Political instability in the United States	34	56	9	0

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	Percentage saying 'critical threat' (ranked by 2022 responses)									
	2006	2008	2009	2014	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Russia's foreign policy	-	-	-	-	32	-	-	-	-	68
China's foreign policy	-	-	-	-	36	-	-	-	-	65
Cyberattacks from other countries	-	-	-	51	55	57	62	-	62	64
A military conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	52	64
Climate change ^b	68	66	52	46	57	58	64	59	61	62
North Korea's nuclear program	-	-	-	-	65	66	60	-	56	58
A severe downturn in the global economy	-	-	-	-	53	50	51	71	50	55
The rise of authoritarian systems of government around the world	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	41	-	55
Foreign interference in Australian politics	-	-	-	-	-	41	49	42	49	49
International terrorism	73	66	68	65	68	66	61	46	51	48
Covid-19 and other potential epidemics ^c	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	76	59	42
Political instability in the United States	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34

^b From 2006–2009, this question asked about 'global warming' rather than 'climate change'.

^c In 2020, asked as 'novel coronavirus (COVID-19) and other potential epidemics'.

TABLE 7

Foreign influence

Now about the issue of foreign influence in Australia's political processes. Are you personally concerned or not concerned about the influence of each of the following countries on Australia's political processes?^d

	2018		2020		2022	
	China	United States	China	United States	China	United States
Yes, concerned	63	58	82	61	86	54
No, not concerned	34	40	18	38	13	45
Don't know/no view	3	2	0	0	1	1

^d This survey was fielded in a separate Lowy Institute nationwide poll in November 2020: see Lowy Institute Poll 2021 Methodology for more information.

TABLE 8**AUKUS**

Thinking now about Australia's partnerships in the world. Do you think AUKUS, the security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, will make Australia/our region more safe, less safe or make no difference?

	More safe	Make no difference	Less safe	Not sure	Never heard of AUKUS
Australia	52	22	7	11	8
Our region	49	24	8	11	8

TABLE 9**The Quad**

Do you think the Quad, the partnership between Australia, India, Japan and the United States, will make Australia/our region more safe, less safe or make no difference?

	More safe	Make no difference	Less safe	Not sure	Never heard of the Quad
Australia	53	20	4	10	12
Our region	52	21	5	11	12

TABLE 10**Acquiring nuclear-powered submarines**

Now a question about submarines that are powered by nuclear energy, but do not have nuclear weapons. Are you in favour or against Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines?

Strongly in favour	Somewhat in favour	Total: in favour	Somewhat against	Strongly against	Total: against	Neither in favour nor against	Don't know
33	37	70	17	11	28	1	1

TABLE 11**Acquiring nuclear weapons**

Thinking now about Australia's defence. Would you be in favour or against Australia acquiring nuclear weapons in the future?

Strongly in favour	Somewhat in favour	Total: in favour	Somewhat against	Strongly against	Total: against	Neither in favour nor against	Don't know
11	25	36	24	39	63	1	1

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TABLE 12

Foreign military based in Australia

Are you personally in favour or against Australia allowing the following countries to base military forces here in Australia?

	Strongly in favour	Somewhat in favour	Total: in favour	Somewhat against	Strongly against	Total: against	Don't know
United States	22	41	63	22	14	36	1
United Kingdom	22	45	67	21	11	32	1
Percentage saying 'strongly in favour' and 'somewhat in favour' (ranked by 2022 responses)							
	2011		2013		2022		
United Kingdom	–		–		67		
United States	55		61		63		

TABLE 13

Tensions in the Australia–France relationship

Now thinking about Australia's relationship with France. Which country is more to blame for the tensions in the Australia–France relationship?

They are equally to blame	Australia is more to blame	France is more to blame	Not sure
49	35	12	4

TABLE 14

Use of Australian military forces

Now about Australian military forces. There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using Australian military forces in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about the following situations. Would you personally be in favour or against the use of Australian military forces:

Percentage saying 'in favour' (ranked by 2022 responses)	2017	2019	2022
To stop a government from committing genocide and killing large numbers of its own people	76	80	79
To restore law and order in a Pacific nation	77	77	75
To conduct freedom of navigation naval operations in the South China Sea and other disputed areas claimed by China ^a	68	60	60
If China invaded Taiwan and the United States decided to intervene	–	43	51
To fight against violent extremist groups in the Middle East ^f	61	50	41
If Russia invaded one of its neighbours	31	–	40

^a In 2017, the question asked 'In response to China's increasing military activities in the South China Sea, the United States has been conducting military operations designed to ensure freedom of navigation in the region. Are you personally in favour or against Australia conducting similar operations in an effort to ensure freedom of navigation in the South China Sea?'

^f In 2017 and 2019, the question asked was: 'To fight against violent extremist groups in Iraq and Syria'.

TABLE 15**Concern about world events: Russia**

Now thinking about world events. To what extent are you concerned or not concerned about: ^g

	Very concerned	Somewhat concerned	Total: concerned	Not too concerned	Not at all concerned	Total: not concerned
Russia's invasion of Ukraine	69	23	92	4	3	7
China–Russia cooperation	56	31	87	9	4	13
India–Russia cooperation	28	44	72	22	6	28

^g This question was fielded in a separate Lowy Institute nationwide poll in April 2022: see Methodology, p.49.

TABLE 16**Australia's response to the war in Ukraine**

Thinking more about Russia's invasion of Ukraine, would you support or oppose Australia: ^h

	Strongly support	Somewhat support	Total: support	Somewhat oppose	Strongly oppose	Total: oppose	Don't know
Keeping strict sanctions on Russia	69	20	89	5	4	9	1
Admitting Ukrainian refugees into Australia	61	29	90	7	3	10	1
Providing military aid to Ukraine	52	31	83	10	6	16	1

^h This question was fielded in a separate Lowy Institute nationwide poll in April 2022: see Methodology, p.49.

TABLE 17**China as a military threat**

Now about China. Do you think it is likely or unlikely that China will become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years? If likely, is that very likely or somewhat likely? If unlikely, is that very unlikely or somewhat unlikely?

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2017	2018	2022
Very likely	15	19	18	14	16	19	14	15	15	32
Somewhat likely	26	27	26	26	25	29	25	31	31	43
Total: likely	41	46	44	40	41	48	39	46	46	75
Somewhat unlikely	38	36	35	39	36	32	33	34	36	17
Very unlikely	19	16	20	19	18	18	23	16	14	6
Total: unlikely	57	52	55	58	54	50	56	50	50	23

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TABLE 18

China: economic partner or security threat

Thinking now about Australia and China. In your own view, is China more of an economic partner to Australia or more of a security threat to Australia?

	2015	2017	2018	2020	2021	2022
More of a security threat ⁱ	15	13	12	41	63	63
More of an economic partner	77	79	82	55	34	33
Both equally	4	5	0	3	1	3
Neither	2	0	3	0	0	0
Don't know/no view	3	3	3	1	1	1

ⁱ In 2015, 2017 and 2018, the question asked if China was 'more of a military threat'.

TABLE 19

Importance of the US alliance

Thinking now about the United States. How important is our alliance relationship with the United States for Australia's security?

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Very important	45	42	36	42	55	56	59	59	54	52	53	42	53	48	38	43	47	60
Fairly important	27	28	27	34	30	30	23	28	28	26	27	29	24	28	34	35	31	27
Total: very and fairly important	72	70	63	76	85	86	82	87	82	78	80	71	77	76	72	78	78	87
Somewhat important	20	22	27	20	12	12	15	12	16	17	16	22	18	20	23	18	21	11
Not at all important	7	8	9	4	2	2	3	1	3	4	4	7	4	4	4	4	2	2
Don't know/no view	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0

TABLE 20**Attitudes to the United States**

Here are some different arguments about the alliance relationship with the United States. For each one, please indicate whether you personally agree or disagree.

Percentage saying 'agree' (ranked by 2022 responses)	2011	2015	2019	2021	2022
Australia's alliance with the United States makes it more likely Australia will be drawn into a war in Asia that would not be in Australia's interests	73	58	69	–	77
The United States would come to Australia's defence if Australia were under threat	–	–	73	75	76
The alliance relationship with the United States makes Australia safer from attack or pressure from China	57	53	56	–	64

TABLE 21**Military conflict between China and the United States**

In the event of a military conflict between China and the United States, please say which one of the following statements comes closest to your own personal view.

	2021	2022
Australia should remain neutral	57	51
Australia should support the United States	41	46
Australia should support China	1	1
Don't know	1	2

TABLE 22**Democracies around the world**

Here is a list of countries and territories. For each one, please select whether you agree or disagree that the country or territory is a democracy.

	Agree	Disagree	Don't know
United Kingdom	92	6	1
United States	87	11	1
Japan	84	13	3
Taiwan	68	28	4
India	68	28	4
Papua New Guinea	63	32	5
Indonesia	48	47	5
Hong Kong	28	68	4
China	7	91	2

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Percentage saying 'agree' (ranked by 2022 responses)	2020	2022
United Kingdom	90	92
United States	81	87
Japan	79	84
Taiwan	52	68
India	57	68
Papua New Guinea	53	63
Indonesia	39	48
Hong Kong	37	28
China	10	7

TABLE 23

Attitudes to democracy

Now a question about democracy. I am going to read you three statements about democracy. Please say which one of the three statements comes closest to your own personal views about democracy.

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020 ⁱ	2022
Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government	60	59	60	65	61	60	62	65	71	74
In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable	23	26	24	18	24	20	20	22	16	18
For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have	15	13	13	15	12	16	15	12	12	7
Don't know/no view	1	2	3	2	3	4	3	1	1	1

ⁱ This survey was fielded in a separate Lowy Institute nationwide poll in November 2020: see Lowy Institute Poll 2021 Methodology for more information.

TABLE 24**Optimism about Australia's economic performance**

Thinking about Australia's economic performance in the world. Overall, how optimistic are you about Australia's economic performance in the world over the next five years?

	2005	2007	2008	2009	2010	2012	2013	2015	2016	2017	2019	2020	2021	2022
Very optimistic	14	19	11	16	19	13	14	9	9	9	5	3	10	5
Optimistic	53	52	65	70	67	61	62	54	61	65	60	49	69	57
Total: optimistic	67	71	76	86	86	74	76	63	70	74	65	52	79	62
Pessimistic	8	9	19	11	10	20	15	29	25	20	30	38	19	32
Very pessimistic	2	2	4	2	3	5	6	5	5	4	4	10	3	5
Total: pessimistic	10	11	23	13	13	25	21	34	30	24	34	48	22	37
Neutral ^k	21	17	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Don't know/no view	2	2	1	1	1	1	3	3	1	3	1	0	0	1

^k A neutral option was offered to respondents in 2005 and 2007.

TABLE 25**Globalisation**

Now on globalisation. Do you believe that globalisation, especially the increasing connections of our economy with others around the world, is mostly good or mostly bad for Australia?

	2006	2008	2009	2017	2019	2020 ¹	2022
Mostly good for Australia	64	72	79	78	72	70	73
Mostly bad for Australia	28	23	18	15	24	29	23
Neither/don't know/no view	8	6	4	8	4	1	4

¹ In 2020, this question was asked as part of COVIDpoll by the Lowy Institute, in a nationally representative online and telephone survey conducted by the Social Research Centre between 14 and 27 April 2020.

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TABLE 26

Attitudes to free trade

Overall, do you personally think free trade is good or bad for each of the following:

	2017			2019			2022		
	Good	Bad	Neither/ don't know	Good	Bad	Neither/ don't know	Good	Bad	Neither/ don't know
Your own standard of living	67	16	16	75	20	5	80	16	3
The Australian economy	67	23	10	71	25	4	78	18	3
Australian companies	61	28	11	65	31	4	71	26	3
Creating jobs in Australia	55	35	10	61	35	4	66	31	3

TABLE 27

Global responses to Covid-19

Overall, how well or badly do you think each of the following countries has handled the Covid-19 pandemic so far?^m

	Very well	Fairly well	Total: well	Fairly badly	Very badly	Total: badly	Don't know
New Zealand	51	41	92	6	3	9	0
Singapore	25	59	84	10	2	12	4
Australia	24	56	80	14	5	19	0
China	10	35	45	27	27	54	2
United Kingdom	3	36	39	46	14	60	1
United States	2	23	25	43	31	74	1

Percentage saying 'very' or 'fairly well' (ranked by 2022 responses)

	2020	2021	2022
New Zealand	–	–	92
Singapore	79	–	84
Australia	93	95	80
China	31	45	45
United Kingdom	30	19	39
United States	10	7	25

^m In 2020 and 2021, this question asked 'Overall how well or badly do you think each of the following countries has handled the Covid-19 coronavirus outbreak so far?'

TABLE 28

Immigration and national identity

Next, indicate whether the first statement or the second statement comes closer to your own views, even if neither is exactly right.

	2018	2022
Australia's openness to people from all over the world is essential to who we are as a nation	53	68
If Australia is too open to people from all over the world, we risk losing our identity as a nation	41	31
Not sure	5	1

TABLE 29

Post-pandemic immigration

Thinking now about the pause in Australia's immigration during the pandemic. Now that borders have reopened, over the next 12 months, do you think the number of immigrants allowed into Australia should be:

Around the same as pre-Covid levels	Lower than pre-Covid levels	Higher than pre-Covid levels	Not sure
46	33	21	1

TABLE 30

Attitudes to global warming

Now about global warming. There is a controversy over what the countries of the world, including Australia, should do about the problem of global warming. Please indicate which of the following three statements comes closest to your own point of view.

	2006	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Global warming is a serious and pressing problem. We should begin taking steps now even if this involves significant costs	68	60	48	46	41	36	40	45	50	53	54	59	61	56	60	60
The problem of global warming should be addressed, but its effects will be gradual, so we can deal with the problem gradually by taking steps that are low in cost	24	32	39	40	40	45	44	38	38	36	37	31	28	34	30	29
Until we are sure that global warming is really a problem, we should not take any steps that would have economic costs	7	8	13	13	19	18	16	15	12	11	9	10	10	10	9	10
Don't know/refused	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0

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TABLE 31

Potential federal government policies on climate change

Would you support or oppose the following federal government policies?

	2021			2022		
	Support	Oppose	Don't know	Support	Oppose	Don't know
Providing subsidies for the development of renewable energy technologies	91	8	1	90	9	2
Committing to a more ambitious emissions reduction target for 2030	-	-	-	77	21	2
Australia hosting a UN Climate Conference	-	-	-	75	22	2
Introducing an emissions trading scheme or a carbon tax	64	33	3	64	33	3
Reducing Australian coal exports to other countries	63	33	3	65	33	3
Banning new coal mines from opening in Australia	63	34	2	63	34	3
Increasing the use of gas for Australia's energy generation	58	38	3	59	37	3
Removing the existing ban on nuclear power	47	51	2	52	45	3
Providing subsidies for building new coal-fired power plants	30	67	3	33	65	3

TABLE 32

Budget priorities

Now about the federal budget. If you were making up the budget for the federal government this year, would you personally increase spending, decrease spending or keep spending about the same for:

	2019			2022		
	Increase spending	Keep spending about the same	Decrease spending	Increase spending	Keep spending about the same	Decrease spending
Health	81	16	3	83	15	2
Education	74	23	3	69	28	3
Social welfare	47	37	16	56	32	11
Defence	31	47	21	51	36	13
Border protection	32	52	16	39	44	16
Foreign aid	17	36	47	24	42	34

TABLE 33

Foreign aid to the Pacific

Thinking specifically about foreign aid to Pacific Island nations. Would you personally be in favour or against Australia providing aid for the following purpose:

	In favour	Against
Disaster relief	93	7
Covid-19 vaccines	86	14
Long-term economic development	84	15
To help prevent China from increasing its influence in the Pacific	82	16
Climate change action	75	25

TABLE 34

Potential Chinese military base in the Pacific

Now thinking about world events. To what extent are you concerned or not concerned about: China potentially opening a military base in a Pacific Island country?ⁿ

Very concerned	Somewhat concerned	Total: concerned	Not too concerned	Not at all concerned	Total: not concerned
60	28	88	9	3	12

ⁿ This question was fielded in a separate Lowy Institute nationwide poll in April 2022: see Methodology, p.49.

TABLE 35

Australia's foreign policy priorities

Now on Australian foreign policy. Which of the following should be the highest priority for the federal government's foreign policy?^o

Focusing on Australia's region including Asia and the Pacific	Focusing on global cooperation through multilateral institutions including the United Nations	Focusing on cooperation with Western countries and traditional partners including the United States	Don't know
43	33	20	4

^o This question was fielded in a separate Lowy Institute nationwide poll in April 2022: see Methodology, p.49.

TABLE 36

Feelings towards other countries

Please rate your feelings towards some countries, territories and institutions, with one hundred meaning a very warm, favourable feeling, zero meaning a very cold, unfavourable feeling, and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from zero to one hundred: the higher the number the more favourable your feelings are towards that country, territory or institution. If you have no opinion or have never heard of that country, territory or institution, please say so.^P

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
New Zealand	-	81	-	83	84	85	85	-	84	83	-	85	86	86	-	87	86
Canada	-	-	-	80	82	-	-	-	81	-	84	-	84	-	79	-	80
United Kingdom ^q	74	75	77	-	-	79	-	77	-	79	-	81	82	76	74	76	77
Japan	64	63	64	66	64	67	70	65	67	68	70	71	74	72	69	73	74
France	-	-	69	-	70	-	-	-	71	-	-	71	70	-	-	-	69
Ukraine	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	51	-	-	-	-	-	-	69
Tonga	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	67
United States	62	60	64	67	68	70	71	70	71	73	68	69	67	63	62	62	65
Taiwan	-	-	-	-	-	58	-	-	-	-	59	-	60	59	57	62	64
Vietnam	-	60	-	-	61	-	-	61	-	-	-	-	-	-	58	-	64
South Korea	56	-	50	53	-	57	61	-	59	-	-	60	62	-	57	61	63
European Union	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	62	67	66	60	62	62
Papua New Guinea	63	57	60	-	62	-	64	60	59	58	63	61	63	59	56	60	61
United Nations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	62	-	-	-	61	-	61
India	62	55	57	56	55	56	58	55	57	56	59	60	58	53	52	56	57
Indonesia	50	47	50	49	54	51	54	53	52	46	54	55	54	51	51	55	57
Myanmar ^r	-	-	-	46	-	-	50	50	50	-	55	54	50	46	-	41	46
Afghanistan	-	-	-	37	40	37	38	-	38	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36
China	61	56	56	53	54	53	59	54	60	58	58	59	58	49	39	32	33
Russia	-	-	55	-	55	-	-	-	-	45	52	50	47	43	42	41	19

^P In 2006, this question asked respondents about their feelings towards 'countries and peoples'. From 2007 to 2018, this question asked respondents about their feelings towards 'countries'.

^q Until 2015, asked as 'Great Britain'; from 2015 asked as 'United Kingdom (Great Britain)'.

^r Until 2019, asked as 'Myanmar/Burma'. From 2021, asked as 'Myanmar'.

ABOUT THE POLL

Methodology

The 2022 Lowy Institute Poll reports the results of a national survey of 2006 Australian adults between 15 and 28 March 2022. The survey was conducted by the Social Research Centre (SRC), using the Life in Australia™ panel — currently the only probability-based online panel in Australia. Members of the panel were randomly recruited via their landline or mobile telephone or via their address (rather than being self-selected volunteers) and agreed to provide their contact details to take part in surveys on a regular basis. SRC uses a mixed-mode approach for the panel, including online surveys (96% of respondents) and computer-assisted telephone interviewing (4% of respondents) to provide coverage of the offline population (households without internet access). The order of questions in the questionnaire was different from the order presented in this report.

On a simple random sample of 2006 responses, the margin of error is 2.2%. Where a complex sample is used, the 'design effect' measures the additional variance in comparison with a simple random sample. The design effect for this survey is estimated at 1.77. For the 2022 Lowy Institute Poll survey, a completion rate of 71.7% was achieved. Taking into account the recruitment rate to the panel and attrition from the panel, the cumulative response is 5.4%, which compares favourably with many international probability-based panels. Unlike other commercial online panels in Australia, the probability basis of the Life in Australia™ sampling method means results are generalisable to the national population and sampling errors and confidence intervals can be calculated.

In 2019, the Lowy Institute completed a three-year transition in the methodology for Lowy Institute

polling, which until 2017 was conducted solely by telephone. From 2005 to 2011, the Poll was conducted by landline only. From 2012 to 2017, it was conducted using both landline and mobile numbers. In 2017, the SRC administered four key questions from the Poll to an online sample of 2513 respondents in parallel with the telephone survey of 1200 respondents, which was reported in the 2017 Lowy Institute Poll. This parallel survey provided valuable comparison information between the two methodologies. In 2018, the Lowy Institute Poll was a combination of a telephone-only sample of 600 respondents and an online sample of 600 respondents drawn from Life in Australia™. In 2019, the Lowy Institute Poll was administered in the same way as in 2020: with approximately 90% of respondents online and 10% offline.

In order to ensure comparability of the 2018 Poll with the telephone responses of our 2005–17 Polls, the response sets were weighted and blended using the following approach: first, weights for the telephone respondents (50% of the sample) were calculated accounting for the dual chances of being contacted by landline or mobile, and reflecting key population characteristics. Then, for each online respondent, the most similar telephone respondent was found using a range of survey variables, and that person's telephone weighting was used as the 'base weight' for the next step. Finally, the telephone and online responses were then combined into a single data set, and the results then weighted to reflect the demographic profile of the Australian population aged 18 years and over based on Australian Bureau of Statistics population data.

The transition to a predominantly online survey panel for Lowy Institute polls mirrors shifts in survey methods by highly respected polling organisations internationally. The Pew Research Center has moved the majority of its US polling online over the past five years, primarily through its American Trends Panel, another probability-based online panel.¹ The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, which has been conducting nationwide surveys on foreign policy since 1974, moved to online polling in 2004.²

1 Courtney Kennedy and Claudia Deane, "What our Transition to Online Polling Means for Decades of Phone Survey Trends", Fact Tank, Pew Research Center, 27 February 2019, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/27/what-our-transition-to-online-polling-means-for-decades-of-phone-survey-trends/>.

2 Marshall M. Bouton, Catherine Hug, Steven Kull et al, "2004 Chicago Council Survey", The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 4 September 2004, <https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/research/public-opinion-survey/2004-chicago-council-survey>.

The decision to move to an online survey methodology was made because of the declining productivity of telephone surveys. The number of fixed-line telephones is steadily decreasing, and more of the population has moved to mobile-only households, which facilitates call-screening. A decline in contact rates and, to a lesser extent, cooperation rates, has led to reduced response rates for landline and mobile phones.

Some questions in the 2022 Lowy Institute Poll are new and are not affected by the possibility of ‘mode’ differences (where respondents may answer the same question differently in an interviewer-administered telephone survey compared with an online survey, which removes the human element and provides more time for consideration of responses). However, the majority of questions in the 2022 survey are ‘tracking’ questions that have been asked in previous Lowy Institute polls, allowing us to compare public opinion on a single issue over time. Footnotes and dotted lines have been used in the charts in the Poll to represent this change of mode, which can elicit slightly different responses.

The question regarding ‘Confidence in global leaders’ was administered differently in 2021 and 2022. In 2021, online respondents were able to select ‘never heard of the person’ or ‘don’t know’ on the first response screen. In 2022, respondents were only offered these responses if they declined to answer at the first response screen. This resulted in a significant difference in the number of respondents who said they had ‘never heard of the person’ when compared to 2021. The decision was made to re-ask this question in the same format as 2021, to ensure the results were comparable. Respondents were contacted again between 1 and 4 May and 1715 responses to the ‘Confidence in global leaders’ question were completed.

Data quality checks for the online portion of the sample included checks for ‘speeding’ (completing the survey rapidly), ‘straight-lining’ (providing the

same answer to every question of a bank of items with the same response options), and the number of non-substantive responses given (don’t know or refused). There was no single determining factor in deciding whether to exclude a case: factors were considered together and included the degree of speeding and the difficulty of straight-lining a particular bank of items.

April 2022 poll

The Lowy Institute fielded additional questions in a nationally representative online and telephone survey conducted by the SRC between 14 and 24 April 2022, with a sample size of 3583 Australian adults. The order of questions in the survey was different from the order presented in this report. The survey was also conducted using the Life in Australia™ panel as explained above.

On a simple random sample of 3583 responses, the margin of error is approximately 1.6%. Where a complex sample is used, the ‘design effect’ measures the additional variance in comparison with a simple random sample. The design effect for this survey is estimated at 1.78.

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